TNAG-0617-FCO40-765-Strength-and-cost-of-UK-armed-forces-stationed-in-Hong-Kong-1977 — Page 65

ཀ སདྡྷག་

CONFIDENTIAL

These general considerations would appear to hold good as long as Hong Kong remains

British.

6. Geographical factors require there to be a raritime element in the security forces

of the Colony. Although there is clearly a role for the Royal Hong Kong Marine Police,

it would be politically unacceptable not to retain a Royal Navy element capable of

reinforcing the indigenous maritime force as an indication to both the Government

and populace of the Colony, and to the Chinese Peoples' Republic, of HMGs commitment to

the territorial integrity of Hong Kong.

THE ROLE OF THE KN IN HONG KONG

7. The current definition of the roles of the Royal Navy in Hong Kong was endorsed

by the Chief of Staff earlier this year (3), namely

"a.

To assist in maintaining the authority of the Hong Kong Government.

b. To sustain local confidence in in HMG's intention to maintain the

British position in the Colony by providing patrols in support of the

RHK Marine Police".

8. These roles can be undertaken by relatively cheap, simple vessels; to contemplate

any widening of the role, for example, to resist determined incursion into Heng Kong

waters by units of the CCN would create the need for a Squadron of an entirely

different order of ɛize, capability and sophistication, and should therefore be

discounted. The roles, as stated in para 7 above, would appear to be likely to continue

unchanged for the forseeable future.

TYPE OF REPLACEMENT

9. The nature of the role, and many years experience of operating the Hong Kong

Squadron, indicates a minimum requirement for one vessel to be on patrol in the Colony's

waters at all times, or to be at not more than 2 hours notice.

This argues the need

(3) COS 1246/756 of 30 June 1977

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CONFIDENTIAL