TNAG-0617-FCO40-765-Strength-and-cost-of-UK-armed-forces-stationed-in-Hong-Kong-1977 — Page 61

D/DS6/16/43/2

CONFIDENTIAL

Head of DS 4 DNOR

D of DP(C)

DN Plans

Head of GF 3

HKK 0622

105501977

5. 51

"crion Taken

Copy to:- AUS(GS)

Head of DS 1

Head of DS 5

No

rokd

43

FCO Hong Kong Department

REPLACEMENT OF HONG KONG PATROL CRAFT

نگتر

Reference: A. DNOR 22617/2/2 dated 5 August 1977.

DS4/MG/428/77 dated 6 September 1977. D/DS6/16/43/2 dated 7 September 1977.

B. C.

why

20

Not to all nor needed.

As a result of the discussions referred to in References B and C it was agreed that we should take the lead, in parallel with the drafting of the NST, in the preparation of a paper which might serve as a vehicle to obtain general MUD and Whitehall agreement to the basis on which discussions would need to be held with the Hong Kong Government on the replacement craft.

2. The first draft of this paper is attached, for comment and clearance at branch level within the MOD. I am copying the draft to the FCO Hong Kong Department in order to give them an indication of what is in hand and so that they may note that in the fairly near future we shall be seeking their assistance on the political aspects of the matter.

3.

I would be grateful for comments and suggested amendments to the draft by Tuesday 4 October. I would also be grateful if Head of DS 4, in consultation with DNOR, could consider any additional circulation required within the Naval Staff so that. he could hopefully give me their co-ordinated view on the paper.

4.

As to the paper itself, I can see that the political arguents to back the case for the present task continuing beyond the period

Jac of the existing DCA may need to be buffed up in due course. section on the role in paras 7 and 8 has deliberately been kept short in view of the COS endorsement this as recently as June of this year. The part of the paper devoted to the type of replace- ment is indicative of the "chicken and egg" problem which can be simply staten as having, on the one hand, a sufficiently clear line on which to go in to bat with the Hong Kong Government whilst, on the other hand, not committing our own planners toofirmly to e particular type of replacement at this stage. Any advice that addressees can give on the wording of this section would be welcomed.

1.

CONFIDENTIAL