TNAG-0617-FCO40-765-Strength-and-cost-of-UK-armed-forces-stationed-in-Hong-Kong-1977 — Page 146

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HONG KONG. DEFENCE COSTE AGREEMENT AND REINFORCEMENT OF THE GARRISON

2

1. I have had a quick look at Mr Cousins' letter of 18 May and the enclosed copies of correspondence between the CBF in Hong Kong and the Governor.

2. What the Governor says in paragraph 5 of his letter to General Archer is that he would "like ...

... to be consulted if there is to be any change in the existing arrangements for reinforcing it [the Garrison]". I am not sure whether this could be interpreted as a bid for "involvement in the policy-making process" in connection with the Brunei negotiations and the position of the Gurkha battalion in Brunei (see the first sentence at the top of page 2 of Mr Cousins' letter).

3. This said, I agree with the assumption on which Mr Cousins says that the MOD have tended to operate in the context of the Brunei negotiations, namely, that once these have been brought to a conclusion, "there must be consultations with the Hong Kong Government on the implications for their security in the absence of any secure or prompt reinforcement capability, before any public announcements are made" (See the last sentence on the first page of Mr Cousins' letter). I consider that such an assumption is consistent with at least the spirit, if not necessarily the letter, of the third clause of the Memorandum of Understanding on the 1975 Defence Costs Agreement with Hong Kong. This read as follows:-

•

"and whereas the United Kingdom Government has confirmed

that reinforcement of the Garrison will be effected should circumstances so require"

It might be argued that this wording would entitle HMG to change the arrangements for the reinforcement of the Garrison in Hong Kong without consultation with the Hong Kong Government, provided it could be demonstrated that reinforcement from the UK, which would be the only alternative to reinforcement from Brunei, would be effective. I think, however, that the Hong Kong, Government would have reasonable grounds for dissatisfaction if we were not to consult them properly about any changes in the arrangements for reinforcements.

4.

Mr Cousins will have written his letter without having the benefit of seeing Hong Kong telegram No 500 of 17 May. (Incidentally, while it is SEAD's business, I should have thought that this telegram ought to be copied to the MOD). This states that "it is very important that we [the Hong Kong Government] should be able to continue to look to Brunei for speedy initial reinforcement in a crisis, and the facilities there are essential for Gurkha training and morale". Mr Murray's personal telegram to the Governor, which has elicited this up-to-date statement of the Hong Kong Government's position, does constitute an act of consultation and, to that extent therefore, the point that the Governor made in paragraph 5 of his letter to General Archer is being made. I think that the process of consultation with the Hong Kong Government should continue and, with that in view, we should encourage the MOD to

/proceed

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