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Mr Oakley said that on the contrary all the domestic pressures were to sit tight. The US had however told the Vietnamese the US would not oppose Vietnamese admission to the UN. Mr Holbrooke said the US had not however yet decided to vote for Vietnam. Mr Cortazzi asked whether a visit to Washington by HM Ambassador in Hanoi would be of use. Mr Holbrooke said that they would be delighted to see the Ambassador if there was any chance of his coming to Washington. Mr Cortazzi said one of our problems related to the Hong Kong belongers in Saigon. We were looking for trade opportunities and had sold ajute mill on commercial terms. We were also interested in over-flying rights on the Bangkok/Hong Kong route. This was a common problem for many countries in the area. On the aid side we had a modest English- language teaching problem but had hitherto not given capital aid. The question of human rights was a major problem.
12. Mr Holbrooke said the US were in the process of defining human rights to cover economic and social rights not just the traditional political freedoms. In his own view aid should not be cut off just because of the nature of the government if it would benefit the people of the country. He referred to the general problem posed by the actions of the Congress in setting conditions for US aid to international financial institutions. He was strongly opposed to aid to Vietnam on the lines of the Kissinger ideas, at the present time, although it might be possible to manage some humanitarian aid at a later date. For the moment, even that was not worth discussing since the attitude of Congress ruled it out completely. He mentioned Indonesia's deep concern that the US might give Vietnam aid which would boost them ahead of the ASEAN countries.
MONGOLIA
13.
Mr Cortazzi asked how the US viewed the possibility of establishing a mission in Ulan Bator. Mr Holbrooke said the US had told the Mongolians they were ready to establish diplomatic relations, but they had not yet replied. The Mongolians had been aggrieved by the Nixon Administration for reasons which were not now important. He also guessed that the Russians did not want the US presence there. He thought it extremely important that the British did not withdraw. It would work against both policy and operational considerations. This was the considered view of the Department of State.
ASEAN
14. Mr Heginbotham explained that it was US policy to strengthen economic relations as a token of good faith and of US interest in the area. This focussed around commodity policy, investments and the North/South dialogue. The ASEAN countries had added the theme of cooperation and economic development. The Asian Development Bank seemed to offer the most interesting possibilities to enhance the US role in regional type projects, given that major participation
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