TNAG-0616-FCO40-764-Policy-of-UK-on-status-of-Hong-Kong-1977 — Page 167

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Their signals over Taiwan just about fell short of saying that they would liberate their land by force. In fact they were creating diffi-. culties for the US Administration. He instanced a high level Chinese group which was currently visiting the US, saying that Taiwan was their problem, and should be settled in their own way. This dis- mayed many people, particularly those in favour of normalisation. The case for normalisation depended in part on a plausible argument that relations would be better as a result, and that there would be no loss of security for Taiwan. Mr Gleysteen said that seen from a Chinese point of view there were three points:

9.

(i)

(ii)

they did not think the US was performing its Chinese assigned role properly in confronting the USSR;

this was an ideological complaint which the US side could not really accommodate.

One or two of their leading Ministers were well known for vindictive remarks about leading foreign politicians. They had spoken roughly about Kissinger in his day, just as they spoke roughly about the current US Administration; this was an effort to manipulate foreign attitudes and

opinions.

(iii) There was a more considered reaction, expressed through

the Hong Kong press or other channels, which the Chinese definitely thought would therefore reach the United States

There no

Mr Gleysteen said this added up to an unattractive picture for a political leader who had to bring his own public opinion round on the issue of normalisation. When this difficulty was explained to the Chinese they apparently did not care. This reflected the fact that the Chinese sitting in Peking were massively preoccupied with domestic problems and ignorant of the outside world. doubt were Chinese who understood the outside world better and who were less heavy handed. But for the moment the US did not expect any subtle or flexible response from Peking. Mr Holbrooke said it was now only six weeks from Secretary Vance's visit, yet the Chinese were making it clear that they regarded the US as the demandeur in the relationship, whilst the Chinese had fixed positions. It was his guess that the visit would turn out to be a fairly routine exchange of views without major developments. Nevertheless the US Administration believed it was imperative to try and move forward in the bilateral relationship; if not there was the risk of moving backwards. Furthermore, this was the last area of the world with which the Administration had dealt. There had been high level visits from almost everywhere else. At a minimum they hoped to achieve an improvement in bilateral relations from the visit to Peking, but he was far from sure that even that could be achieved. The Chinese had been absolutely unbending.

10.

From the Chinese point of view, Mr Holbrooke continued that they would argue that the US had done nothing for them. Africa had featured regularly, the Chinese railed at the Americans for not stopping the Russians in Africa. Vance would tell them in detail

/exactly

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