TNAG-0595-FCO40-742-Principles-and-procedures-of-granting-independence-1977 — Page 3

FLAGA.

1.

CODE 18-77

Reference..

HKG 012/5

•

Mr Milton

Millor

CONFIDENTIAL

BH

X.

Days. J34/7

du. Jaster one with Boy B

11827/4. But Di PA 15147

SEYCHELLES: COUP

A further report Mr Ewans' minute of 23 points of interest but

Moved, thanks.

Kim. 27/6.

has been received from Mr Pugh under cover of

June, on the Seychelles Coup which contained several does not add materially to our understanding of the nature of this event. We still await a more complete study of the position in answer to my minute of 16 June to Mr Carter, EAD.

2.

-

Mr Rene has apparently stressed the "moderate" tone of his Government but he is also seeking to draw up a new constitution to be followed perhaps by elections. It will be interesting to see what type of constitution Mr Rene has in mind and how far to the "Left" he is likely to go. We might find the elections being postponed indefinitely if Mr Rene is unsure of his direction and the pressures too complex.

3. Mr Pugh mentions the reorganisation of the Civil Service (paragraph 3) after the Coup. This bears out my argument that it is important to train, well before the Dependent Territories become independent, a body of competent Civil Servants capable of functioning under difficult conditions this would provide a strong element of stability in a new state.

I am thinking particularly of the problems faced by the Bahamas in the period of self-government immediately before independence because the Ministries were so inadequately staffed and lacked confidence. Crash training programmes had to be set afoot but the Civil Service, at the time of independence, had not reached the standard of efficiency that one would wish to see in a country for whose Government we had been responsible. Perhaps there are lessons to be learned from the Seychelles in this respect.

27 June 1977

J. Jasm.

J S Jasper

Hong Kong and General Department K270

233-4069

LAST PATER

CONFIDENTIAL