TNAG-0595-FCO40-742-Principles-and-procedures-of-granting-independence-1977 — Page 18

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:D IN

KRUISTRY No. 51 16 JUN 1977

HKC 012/5

Mr Cortazzi

Cort

cfaze

SEYCHELLES:

CONFIDENTIAL

in mitten

Mr Staley M 185/6

Mr Stredant

I agree paras арне раче

Мийка поставки. Гаграм

M.

THE OVERTHROW OF MR MANCHAM

3tH

Tam. 1516 14/vi

I think you will be interested to read, at leisure,

Mr Milton's minute of 10 June stimulated by the coup d'etat and the annexed report on the processes of bringing the Seychelles to independence.

2.

Apart from attending the second (successful) Constitutional Conference, I hav virtually nothing to do with Seychelles, but I too have been wondering whether this unhappy event created any lesson for us in the decolonisation programme ahead of us. A re-reading of the report by Mr Stuart and Mr O'Keeffe suggest to me that any critic of British policies in the immediate pre- independence stage might fasten on the decision to accept the coalition deal between Mr Manchan and Mr Rene without the test of a General Election (paragraph 18 and, more generally, paragraph 26). If we were open to criticism on that count, and the report makes a cogent defence, it would not be valid for our plans for the remaining dependencies (eg the Solomon Islands had their elections last year and we are insisting that the Gilbert Islands and Tuvalu should have elections before Constitutional Conferences).

3. I think the main points are that each territory are different, that we can only make the best available arrangements for each, and that there is no way of absolutely guaranteeing the future. We have therefore got to take a chance if we areto proceed with decolonisation the arguments for which we have recently rehearsed, and must expect some disappointments. (The Seychelles Independence Government is not the most shortlived, Zanzibar's lasted less than a month.) On the whole I would not expect the Seychelles affair to be repeated in the Pacific, if only because the political party system has not taken root (the New Hebrides is not really an exception) and there is less danger of outside subversion. There is perhaps more risk of this kind of thing happening in the Caribbean, but we are not yet on the last lap there.

4. Having uttered these personal reflections, I do think that we ought to make a more considered analysis, perhaps with particular reference to the Caribbean, and I would suggest that HK&GD and EAD might in the first instance consult about this once more is known about the reasons for and management of the Seychelles coup.

It. Stauding

10 June 1977

Cc:

Mr Ewans, EAD Mr Stewart, HKGD

CONFIDENTIAL

HSH Stanley