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f this trust were to be lost he would also lose his ability to influence and thus to govern. Consequently his ability to achieve, for instance, social progress, will lessen if he attempts to further policies in any field which are not accepted as actuated primarily by care for Hong Kong interests.
36.
The policies advanced in this paper nevertheless involve some adjustment in our relations with Hong Kong which could well be resented there. Without corrective measures this could significantly affect the chances of the general strategy. Indeed it could lead to a growth of anti-British sentiment which could be corrosive of the Colonial link essential for Hong Kong's existence. It will be necessary to combat this by promoting a wide understanding locally of our overall policy for the Colony and by developing a greater awareness anong Hong Kong Government officials of their role in that overall policy. It will also be necessary to counter general anti-British sentiment by an active information policy. (Opinions on the extent of this differ: but anti-Whitehall and contempt for Britain in its present circumstances are sufficiently widespread for them to be remarked upon by influential visitors to the Colony.)
37. There is a need to continue strongly to advocate Hong Kong's case bero and to counter ill-informed criticism of conditions in the Colony. No policy will convince those critics who for idealistic or ideological notives, or indeed, out of resentment of Hong Kong's competitive power seek to press FHG to enforce change in Hong Kong at a rate faster then the problems allow. But obviously our ability to convince sonc rosponsible critics will depend upon the degree to which the reforms suggested in this Paper are implemented.
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