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ith the present Chinese Government. Any attempt to do so, or to seek to involve them in solving any of the Colony's internal problems will almost certainly meet with a refusal to discuss a matter which they at present propose to regard as exclusively for us. Even in the unlikely event of their accepting to do so, any agroement reached could not bind any successor Government to the present one. And finally discussion could result in their concentrating on small changes of tactical interest to them (eg the appointment of an official Chinese 'representative' which has been raised in the past, most recently in a low key during the Secretary of State's visit to Peking) without commitment on the long term problem of interest to us. This could well limit our freedom of manoeuvre when the time comes to consider the problem as a whole.
19. It follows that the best course to adopt now is to accept the status quo so far as Hong Kong's external position is concerned; and to wait for the successor Government to that of Mao to emorge, establish itself throughout China, and define a generel foreign policy against which to judge the nature and timing of any approach on Hong Kong. Meanwhile it should suffice to avoid actions which on past experience leads us to believe would be inimical to China's interests; and to represent publicly that the existing understanding with China over Hong Kong illustrates the cooperative and friendly nature of our relations which is of mutual benefit, not least of all in trade. (The recent Spey deal, for instance, proves that China counts on our relations being good for some time to come). The policy is not without risks and will, on best assumptions about the continuing tranquillity of China, become increasingly difficult to defend publicly as the attention of the Hong Kong public turns to the consideration of the future. But it is the "least risk" policy and the one best suited to present circumstances.
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