8507 D.073939 200M. 11/74 Cr.P.C. Gp.839/3
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(a) As at (c) with freedom to move towards an elective system for the Legislative Council.
Prospects: Less promising than (c) but greatly to HMG's advantage in making us less answerable for Hong Kong's internal policies. Tolerable for Hong Kong.
(e) UK/Chinese joint administration for a pre-determined (or indefinite) future.
*
Prospects: Possible, provided ultimate Chinese
but no real advantage
sovereignty was recognised:
to the UK and probably intolerable situation diplomatically. Very precarious and unlikely to maintain confidence in Hong Kong.
(f)
UK withdrawal and recognition of Chinese sovereignty in exchange for Chinese recognition of a
special status' for Hong Kong with local Chinese accruing responsibility for internal government.
Prospects: Less promising than (c) or (a)
but a possibility if pragmatic considerations are uppermost in Peking. Solution perhaps most acceptable to HMG but careful explanation would be necessary in Hong Kong and elsewhere if confidence is not to be eroded.
(g) UK withdrawal and negotiated Chinese takeover
on an undertaking to allow a reasonable degree of local political and economic autonomy and security for existing population, business enterprises etc. Frospects: Probably the negotiated solution most acceptable to China but very difficult to sell to the population in Hong Kong and to investors. If possible at all, the agreement would need to contain firm safeguards which may be difficult to obtain.
(h)
± 1997
UK withdrawal and incorporation in China Prospects: Remote unless the ideologues take over in Peking and disastrous if they do. Impossible to announce to population in Hong Kong and impossible.
to implement even gradually without agreement becoming obvious there. Grave political problems for HMG.
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