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the unexpected appointment of
Hua Puo fany bating hume
އ
Minister
demonstrates
the uncertainties
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beyond the mid-nineteen eighties. This is because without confidence in the future, investment in Hong Kong will almost certainly dwindle rapidly thereafter leaving Hong Kong unviable: either a massive drain on British aid or a diminishing asset to China who might be forced to resume possession long before she wishes to do so. And without confidence the present tranquillity will be difficult, perhaps impossible, to sustain.
12. A crucial difficulty in the way of our acting sooner, which in some ways would be preferable, is that meaningful discussion with the Chinese presupposes the existence of an ordered, well-established Government in China. It seemed likely that the present Chinese leadership ha reached agreement on the handling of the succession to Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai but this will only become evident after Mao's death
and there remains the question of whether the successor government can impose itself on China as a whole which may well not be apparent for some years. We will also need time to assess its political stability and the character of its policies both internal and external (not least towards Taiwan) before
we can determine the best negotiating posture.
These
which wall are what considerations point to 1982 or so as a target date confrune at least until Mao's death
and
paras probably beyond;
for starting, and 1985 or so for finishing, a negotiating process with the Chinese; but obviously the question will need to be kept under constant review in the light of the evolving situation in China and in the Colony. Delay is not without risk eg of a crisis in the Colony as a result of instability in China similar to 1967; but our experience of events then provides us with some guide as to the signs of approaching trouble and we need not be as unprepared (Annex A).
13. It may be premature to speculate on what our attitude to the problem should be at a date so far in the future. Options range from a continuation of the status quo, totally unchanged, to an enforced withdrawal sooner than 1997 (see Annex B). As far as can be judged at present, however, the preferred solution would seem to lie between:
7386 D073815 140M 5/74 Cr.P.C. Gp.839/3
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