12.
6.
SECRET
might conclude that the political need to eliminate the existence of a colony on their territory had become dominant and that the economic cost of doing so, though substantial, was no longer intolerable and would have to be accepted. But this is clearly not their
view now.
If we planned a postponement
of negotiation until the first half of the 80s (i.e. shortly before the shadow of the end of the Lease starts to affect Hong Kong's economy) what cards would we have to play?
Positively - if H.M.G. and the
Chinese concluded that their interests lay in the continuation for some further period of something like the status quo continuation of the present advantages enjoyed by China in Hong Kong; negatively, avoidance of a situation in which Hong Kong still had to be fed and supplied from Chinese resources, but without any commensurate return in foreign exchange. This means
that our cards would be:
a)
b)
access to markets to which Hong Kong now exports;
avoidance of dispersal of the productive capacity, marketing expertise and international financial and technical facilities now in Hong Kong, through a
flight from an unwanted Chinese administration.
An additional consideration for China might well be:
13.
c)
postponement of the problem of absorbing
a reluctant population accustomed to standards and a way of life quite different to those in China.
If the Chinese sought the return of Hong Kong immediately or with a fixed transitional period what cards would we have to play?
The need for our co-operation in salvaging such of the benefits which they draw from
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