TNAG-0560-FCO40-655-Review-of-narcotics-problem-in-Hong-Kong-1975 — Page 124

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dislocate those groups which buy and transport the opium through Thailand. The S.U.A.

would be happy to plunder

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if rewarded

anyone trying to break the blockadu.

2. If all the opium was bought through one channel it would force the Ka Kwa Ye and opium traders to draw together, acting against the fragmention which would make the trade harder to control.

3. If opium was actually bought through the S.S.A., it would strengthen the only idealistic organisation in Shan State and give them the whiphand over the Ka Kwa Ye. The fact that the Ka Kwa Ye need the name and the prestige of the S.S.A. at present, does not mean that once established as Resistance forces they could not ignore the S.S.. with impunity. The present alliance is, in fact, one of the rare occasions in Shan politics when it is possible to deal with most of the groups together. Buying through the S.S.A. would prolong this state.

C.

Advantages of dealing with the Resistance rather than the Burmese

1. The rebel armies not the Burmese control the countryside where the opium is grown.

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2. The Resistence - not the Burmese have been successful in suppressing opium. (Since 1971 the Ba O army has virtually abolished opium growing in nearly all the villages of its area.

(In one village 4 opium smokers had been executed the year before our visit).

The Ba O's success comes from the unusual circumstances of their area where cheroot leaf cultivation is well established and more profitable than opium, but it spotlights the fact that it is the Resistance, not the Burmese, who control the farmers.

3. Only the Shans and not the Burmese can offer a permanent solution depending as it does on the political and economic stability of a government supported by the people.

ARGUMENTS AGAINST THE S.S.A.'s PROFOSALS

The arguments against are very strong and very obvious but they are mainly diplomatic or related to the wider strategy of narcotics prevention.

The principal 'local' argument against the proposals is that the Ka Kwa Ye and Resistance armies cannot be trusted and would certainly find a way of twisting the agreement to their own advantage. With the possible exception of the S.S.A., there is no doubt that this is true, but double dealing is so much part of Shan politics, that the certainty that some Ka Kwa Ye will cheat is balanced by the certainty that other Ka Kwa Ye will be happy to betray them for a price. It should therefore be possible to keep the cheating within limits.