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completely unsuccessful in controlling it. Two villages we visited had been ordered by Burmese patrols to stop growing opium one obeyed and we heard of another village where the crop had
been burnt.
But the Burmese Army is kept so busy, that it must be hard for the commanders to find the time to do anything about opium. For instance, the village of La Yu is only 2 miles from
the post of Mong Kau and yet nearly every household has an opium field. Mong Kau is also the checkpoint through which 200 tons of opium passed last year. As the opium was unloaded from the trucks and loaded onto mules in broad daylight not much more than a mile from the post, the commander can hardly pretend not to have known about it. On the other hand, his garrison consists of 20 to 30 men, whilst the average Ka Kwa Ye convoy numbers 200 to 500 soldiers.
b. While we were in Shan State, probably 95% of the opium trade was handled by the allies of the Burmese the Ka Kwa Ye and the K.M.T. The Resistance forces were levying an annual tax of 10% or
O
sometimes 15% on all opium fields, but in 1972 this would not have amounted to more than 3,000 viss. (Appendix - breakdown of S.S.A. Opium Tax 1971. Appendix P estimated opium taxes of other resistance groups.) Some Resistance armies, like the S.U.A. and the groups in Mong Ngen and Petkang, also levy a tax of 2 silver rupees or 20 kyatts on every viss of opium passing through their area. And from time to time each rebel group takes the opium it gets from taxation and sells it in Thailand for guns. None of the resistance armies have the capital, however, to buy and sell opium as a business, and with one or two exceptions, the Chinese merchants of Tangyan and Lashio have never trusted them enough to invest in their convoys. The result was that the armies opposed to the Burmese handled somewhere between 5 and 15 tons of opium, while the armies allied to the Burmese probably handled 500 tons.
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C. The opium trade has, in fact, been a highly successful tool in the hands of the Burmese, and is one reason why the Shans have fought so long without growing much stronger. The Ka Kwa Ye armies of Bo Lai Oo, Bo Mong, Mong Nai, Kya Maw - even Law Hsin Han's soldiers were originally Resistance groups until tempted to join the Burmese by the right to trade. This right also prevented feudal groups like Loi Maw, Vingngun, Ai Sao Shir and Sao Hin Sao Hpa from joining the resistance earlier. (As an example, the offer from Burmese Military Intelligence to the Ba O in 1971 not only included the right to trade, but also 100,000 kyatts to be given to the Ba O leader as personal capital for his own trading). Recently the scandal from towns like Lashio flooded with black market Ka Kwa Ye goods has so undermined the credibility of Ne Win's Socialist State, that it was expedient to expel the Ka Kwa Ye. But if they should now become a serious threat as a Resistance army, then political expedience may well force a return to the earlier policy. As long as there is civil war in Shan State both the Burmese and the rebels will obviously put their political survival before their principles on narcotics. But the Resistance rather than the Burmese have more to gain from any possible deal with a narcotics agency.
4. Flexibility of the Trade
On the average convoy more than half the opium will belong to merchants who are separate entities from the escorting army.
They pay an escort charge of 15% or 200 kyatts per viss, and in some cases like that of the K.M.T. they are forced to sell their opium
to the K.M.T. at the base of Tam Ngop. In other cases, the Ka Kwa Ye
have killed or threatened merchants who have tried to desert to other groups.
But in general 50% or more of the opium moving to Thailand is
bought and sold by independent merchants, and as they control most of
the capital and also the outlets for the returning black market goods,
they are the key to the trade. Their flexibility is the reason why pressure on escorting armies does not restrict the flow of narcotics.
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