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e. On the 18th of January, 21 lorries carrying 300 of Law Hsin Han's men moved south of Lashio down the main road at the same time as 12 trucks and 60 men moved north from Tachilek. If the 21 lorries had carried morphine, Commander Chang would have moved more troops to the road, but his agents reported that this was only a relief force to help the 12 northbound trucks reach Lashio. He therefore ordered the troops close to the road to let the two truck convoys meet, and, on the 21st, they did so at Mong Kung. The trucks then moved north immediately, surprising the S.S.A. who had only 50 men on the road. They fought the advance guard patrolling ahead of the trucks for about an hour before they withdrew. The S.S.A. claimed 16 Law Hsin Han men killed and 31 wounded.
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f. On the 28th of January, when the mule convoy was approaching the S.U.A's forward position near Wan Tsing, 250 of Law Hsin Han's men (the force which had been with the trucks) marched south from Lashio. They had 50 porters with them, and again if these had been carrying morphine, headquarters would have ordered an attack. But the loads were ammunition and the force was let through.
B. On the 8th of February we were with the headquarters force waiting in the main ambush position. Commander Chang's plan was not to use guerilla tactics, but to hold a heavily fortified hill from which he could shell the convoy with 57mm recoilless rifles and 60mm mortars. Law Hsin Han's advance guard would then be forced to attack the 'fort' where Commander Chang hoped to shatter it.
The convoys remaining soldiers would then turn to fight their way out on other routes and be forced to storm similar 'forts'. In this way it was planning to destroy the convoy's escort without harming the mules or their loads.
h. During the night of the 9th, Law Hsin Han's convoy commander, Huang Sin Haw (Shan name Sang Perk) heard about our ambush position, and turned his advance guard to attack the S.U.A. force that was shadowing him. They had dug themselves in on a hill which blocked
the escape route to the west 7 miles from our position. The battle lasted from dawn till night, and hundreds of mortar and recoilless rifle shells were fired. We saw about 30 S.U.A. wounded and they said they had 20 killed. when we moved to a position close to the battleground, the villagers talked of seeing roughly a hundred of Law Hsin Han's soldiers buried. Some were K.M.T. hired for the journey).
j.
This defeat paralysed the convoy and it stayed close to the Burmese garrison at Mong Nang until the 18th of January when a relief force of 100 men arrived from Lashio.
k. The convoy then moved north and Commander Chang hoped to capture it when the advance guard attacked his two 'forts' on the only two crossing points over the Rivers Tung and Long. On the 20th, the convoy moved through the town of Khesi Mansam, and it seemed certain that they would move up the road to Mong Yai. The final battle would then be at the crossing at Wan Wap.
1. However, on the night of the 21st, the Burmese commander in Khesi Mansam ordered a curfew and stopped everyone leaving the town. The convoy then retraced its steps in the dark, moved through the town and escaped westwards while the S.U.A. troop that was meant to be watching the road was asleep. Despite later attempts to cut it off, the convoy got completely away.
m.
On the surface this escape did not appear contrived, and the S.U.A./S.S.A. were bad tempered for days. But for over a
fortnight it had been common knowledge that the Burmese had ordered all Ka kwa Ye to surrender, and that many of the Ka Kwa Ye groups wished to
join the resistance. Just two weeks after his escape Huang Hsin Haw returned to open negotiations with the S.S.A.
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