TNAG-0546-FCO40-641-Strength-of-garrison-in-Hong-Kong-1975 — Page 18

*

Submission 1) 1/1/16

GAMB

Kr Stanley

NEW HEBRIDES:

CONFIDENTIAL

Reference.

Mr

'

This worries minute pou Stanley

ire.

508 M. d

ром.

me to N

1 OSSIBILITY OF CIVIL INSURRECTION AND REINFORCEMENT

OF THE CIVILIAN POWER

WZ2-7

1. You asked me this morning for my preliminary reaction to the possibility of detaching forces from the British Garrison in Hong Kong to support the police in the New Hebrides in the event of a colon

inspired UDI act there.

2.

As I explained, my feeling is that any withdrawal of troops from the Garrison in Hong Kong, particularly at this time, could well lead to strong reactions in Hong Kong. I think I am right in saying that the Hong Kong Government has always been senstitive about any reduction however temporary, in the strength of the Garrison. Although the general feeling is that the risk of serious civil disorders in Hong Kong, such as occurred in 1968, is currently slight, given China's current co-operative attitude, the fact is that the Garrison is there to provide immediate support to the civil authority in the event of trouble. The particular difficulty about detaching forces at the present time is that we have only recently concluded very difficult negotiations with the Hong Kong Government for a new Defence Costs Agreement to come into force next April. HMG's insistence in these negotiations that Hong Kong should pay a much larger share of the costs of what will in any case be a reduced Garrison have caused some uncertainty in Hong Kong about our continuing commitment to its integrity and security. I think it is fair to say that this period of uncertainty has now passed (or is passing) but it could be reawakened by a decision in the near future to detach forces from tie Garrison for use elsewhere. Such a move might even be construed in certain quarters in Hong Kong as an indication that HMG, having obtained a very favourable agreement (in Hong Kong eyes) on defence costs, was now behaving irresponsibly over the running of the Garrison.

3. As I mentioned, I took the opportunity of Mr Male's weekly meeting this morning to air the enquiry you had put to me, emphasising its very preliminary character.. I think it was accepted that my tentative assessment, as in the preceding paragraph, of the likely Hong Kong reactions was broadly on the right lines. However, if there were to be a definite suggestion of reinforcing the New Hebrides administration from Hong Kong we would certainly want to consider it more fully and, of course, to consult the Acting Governor (Sir M Maclchose will not be returning to Hong Kong until 9 January) MOD, DS 6, are very conscious of the political considerations surrounding the presence of the Garrison in Hong Kong and their advice which would have to be sought anyway, would be worth having.

The

4.

I mentioned also that some of those present at Mr Male's meeting had offered personal and very preliminary reactions to your enquiry. Those concerned would have to be consulted properly in the event of the need arising but, at your request and in the interest of speed, I record my understanding of what was said. Mr Bentley said that China': attitude towards a proposal to reinforce the New Hebrides from Hong Kong would turn upon the nature of the insurrection. If the insurrection were to be mounted by the "Feople's Liberation Army" or something of the sort China would strongly oppose Hong Kong forces

/being

CODE 18-77

CONFIDENTIAL

y