TNAG-0543-FCO40-638-Strength-of-garrison-in-Hong-Kong-1975 — Page 174

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CONFIDENT VAL

ANNEX A

to BRIEF G

REACTIONS TO THE 1971 DEFENCE COSTS AGREEMENT

1. The 1971 Defence Costs Agreement negotiations and subsequent publication provoked widespread opposition both from Unofficial Members of the Executive Council and Legislative Council (UMELCO) and later the press. As memories of these negotiations may still be fresh in Hong Kong (two of the present Unofficial Members of ExCo were appointed before the 1971 negotiations) it may be useful

to outline briefly some of the points made by Hong Kong at the time. (These do not, of course, represent HMG's Xews or indeed the views of all representatives of Hong Kong opinion, but they may be useful background when considering our negotiating tactics).

The more important and general arguments used by UMELCO during the negotiations were as follows:-

(a)

It was not accepted that colonial governments were entirely

responsible for all aspects of their internal security. Britain

had an obligation to defend a colonial territory not only against

external aggression but also against internal subversion. In the particular circumstances of Hong Kong, internal and external

defence were com, lementary.

(b) HMG spent large sums in defence and aid contributions

elsewhere and did not expect to be reimbursed.

(c)

Hong Kong was unique as a dependent territory in receiving

little financial aid from the UK.

(a) Hong Kong contributed substantially to the UK economy in other ways, eg through invisible trade, aircraft agreements,etc.

(e) Any defence contribution had to be considered in relation to Hong Kong's planned expenditure on housing, education, social services and public works.

CONFIOZNEVAD

/Arguments