SECRET UK EYES A
Band G (iv) The Prime Minister's suggestion of a personal message
216)
to Sir Murray MacLehose is a good one. To have the maximum impact, the Governor would need this in a form he could show his Executive and Legislative Councils.
It is doubtful, however, whether this should openly
refer to the possibility of further cuts in the garrison. It should be sufficient to refer to our own serious
economic situation.
216
(v) Members of LegCo and ExCo made it clear last year that
they were ready to review Hong Kong's defence
(vi)
(vii)
contribution in view of our economic difficulties.
What would not be tolerable (in terms both of effect on confidence in the Colony and of political relations with Britain) would be for us, in effect, to renege on our commitment to protect Hong Kong and to say the Colony could only have the troops they were prepared to pay for.
Our best way of obtaining a 75% contribution is to negotiate on the basis of a garrison strength which HMG regard as the minimum necessary for its
protection.
It is probably better to begin negotiations with Hong Kong at the official level which is less conspicuous. The Prime Minister's suggestion of sending a Minister to Hong Kong could be looked at again if negotiations seemed to be reaching an impasse.
It is difficult to separate the question of the Brunei Gurkha battalion from that of the Hong Kong garrison. The continued presence of Gurkhas in Brunei is helpful in the Hong Kong context by making the reductions there more palatable to local opinion. It is also an essential element in the Chiefs of Staff acceptance of the reduced garrison.
SECRET UK EYES A
/(viii) ..
...
No comments yet.
Private notes are available after approval.