TNAG-0541-FCO40-636-Strength-of-garrison-in-Hong-Kong-1975 — Page 214

Foreign and Commonwealth Office London SW1

L M Davies Esq CMG OBE Secretary for Security Colonial Secretariat HONG KONG

Telephone 01-

Your reference

Our reference

TIKK 10/1

Date

23 April 1975

18

Dead Dum,

117 SIGNALS UNIT

1.

LAST

REF.

41

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REF.

I am sorry it has taken so long to send a substantive reply to your letter of 3 February to Bruce Dinwiddy. MOD) have now thoroughly examined this question, and have discussed it with Air Commodore Stanton following his return from Hong Kong.

2.

In the general context of the UK Defence Review, HOD would still prefer 117 Signals Unit to be totally closed during the second half of this year. There are no convincing military grounds for continued operation of even part of the Unit, and closure would enable important savings in terms of personnel as well as money. On the other hand, following their discussion with Air Commodore Stanton, MOD are prepared to accept that the use of the Tai Mo Shan radar would provide a desirable, extra area of cover for ATC purposes. They believe that the additional range would be only about 50 miles beyond that provided by the Type 264 radar at Kai Tak; but you are presumably satisfied that the additional range is important.

3.

As you know, continued operation of the search radar for civil ATC purposes would raise a number of difficulties for the MOD. First, at least until alternative arrangements could be made, it would require retention of an RAF party: IOD say this would need to include 36 people (1 officer, 26 other ranks, 3 auxiliary policemen and 6 civilians). Second, since the radar belongs to the USAF, it would be necessary for the latter to agree that it should be retained for the civil task. Third, the Americans would have to agree to supply spare parts. It is apparently not clear (at least to MOD) whether the USAF has sufficient stores of spare parts to maintain the radar for the, say, 2-21 years which might be involved, or, failing this, whether they would be prepared to arrange for further spare parts to be manufactured in the United States. Finally, while the RAF party would be adequate to conduct minor servicing, it would not be adequate for third and fourth line servicing (which at present is a USAF responsibility) unless the RAF set up a very expensive training programme.

SECRET

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