TNAG-0541-FCO40-636-Strength-of-garrison-in-Hong-Kong-1975 — Page 198

FCO40 Hong Kong Department Records 聯邦事務部香港部檔案 All

SECRET UK EYES A

DP Note 212/75(Final) (Continued)

commit HMG to a force level in Hong Kong designed to meet every IS situation envisaged by the Working Party without taking due account of the way in which they qualified the threat, and assessed the risks inherent in the security deficiences they had

indentified.

12. A garrison of 4 stationed infantry battalions and 1 sub unit was the cheapest option tabled by the Working Party. They regarded

it as the absolute minimum which should be considered from the

security point of view but noted that it could have significant security deficiences. The most important of these was the shortfall of 1 infantry battalion and 1 sub unit against the

security yardstick. This was not considered serious in the event

of unrest not related to the Chinese threat. In the event of unrest

involving some change in Chinese policies they considered this garrison could be inadequate. However, in view of the likelihood of some forewarning of any such change in Chinese attitudes, the Working Party concluded that this weakness could be mitigated by an improved reinforcement capability (ie in less than 3 weeks).

13. For as long as the threat remains of the same order as at present and a reinforcement battalion is readily available from Brunei, as well as a slower back-up reinforcement from UK, we consider it acceptable that the stationed infantry force in Hong Kong should consist of only 4 battalions. This is compatible with the views of CBFHK (11) who considers that a 4 battalion infantry force would be militarily acceptable if a reinforcement battalion could be provided in less than 3 weeks (ie from Brunei) and with sone further reinforcement available (ie from UK). We have

accepted that it is currently reasonable to expect some forewarning

of serious IS disorders and consider that the risks inherent in

such a reduced force are acceptable. However in reducing the stationed infantry force to this level it will be necessary to

keep the threat assessment under regular review.

Note: 11.

CBFHK's RTT 2004002 March 1975.

6

SECRET UK EYES A

T

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