TNAG-0540-FCO40-635-Strength-of-garrison-in-Hong-Kong-1975 — Page 98

THE EXPENDITURE COMMITTEE

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24. The Ministry said that the review proposals were not intended to reduce the combat capability of BAOR (Q.112). However, we note that very substantial reductions are proposed in planned purchases of helicopters which will inevitably result in a lower level of mobility and support than might otherwise have been secured, even if the front-line is not directly affected. Since NATO's central strategy demands rapid and flexible response it is unfortunate and may in the long term be damaging that it has been found necessary to propose these reductions. While we welcome the plan to continue efforts to develop, on a collaborative basis, the successor to the Chieftain main battle tank, we consider that it is at least as important to maintain and develop the Army's anti-tank forces and, in particular, heli- copter-borne anti-tank guided weapons in view of their mobility and potential effectiveness in a defensive role.

25. The RAF also will be subjected to very severe cuts in planned expenditure on equipment, although the bulk of these, like the 18,000 cut in RAF manpower, follow from the strategic changes. In particular a cut of about 50 per cent. is proposed for the transport force. The reduction by about one-third in the planned rate of MRCA deliveries results in a very substantial saving in the review period (which will, presumably, involve corresponding increases in years after 1983-84) but with some extra costs arising from extended use of existing aircraft which are to be replaced by MRCA and from increased unit costs of MRCA production. It is never- theless the case that the Ministry stated that, in the period up to 1983–84, 40 per cent. of the RAF equipment vote will be going on the MRCA. The RAF will also operate fewer Nimrod aircraft and helicopters than planned, and it is proposed that 12 of their stations in the United Kingdom should be closed.

26. The Ministry stated that they have had no very positive reaction from our partners in the MRCA project and that the proposed changes could, in certain circumstances, improve the prospects of sales to other countries, presumably because they could take up the slack in the programme created by the deferments. We trust that the possibility of such sales will be urgently pursued. On Nimrod, it now appears that, as a consequence of the review, the military justification for ordering extra aircraft in 1972, primarily for employment reasons, may largely have disappeared. In view of the very high unit cost of these aircraft, some of which are still in course of production, we hope that every effort will be made to take an urgent decision on possible alternative uses, perhaps in the Airborne Early Warning role, or to sell the redundant aircraft.

EQUIPMENT

27. We have already commented in paragraphs 20-25, above, on some of the major savings in planned expenditure on equipment. It is a striking feature of the review that, of the total saving of £4,720 million over the review period, £3,210 million, or 68 per cent., is to be found from savings on the equipment budget as a whole (including R & D). Even so, the review proposals include some increase in real terms over the current level of spend- ing on equipment and at the end of the review period, equipment is expected to absorb a higher proportion than at present of the defence budget. The Ministry stated that less than half of the total equipment savings related to