TNAG-0540-FCO40-635-Strength-of-garrison-in-Hong-Kong-1975 — Page 95

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SECOND REPORT FROM

NATO would remain the first charge on the resources available for defence. We endorse this approach.

Outside NATO

12. The Ministry suggested that, although our commitments outside the NATO area were of lowest priority in strictly military terms, total with- drawal would save no more than about £150 million a year and there were other reasons why some of them could not be given up altogether. These reasons included obligations to our remaining dependencies, some of which are faced with territorial claims by neighbouring states. Forces would be retained in Hong Kong (at a somewhat reduced level), Belize, the Falkland Islands, Gibraltar and Cyprus (with some reductions), and there would be no changes in the arrangement with the Sultan of Oman; in general, except for Diego Garcia and the Integrated Air Defence System in Malaysia, our forces would be withdrawn from other areas'. The Ministry concluded that substantial reductions could be made as a result of a contraction of our com- mitments outside the NATO alliance. While this may be true in its impact on the RAF transport aircraft force, we would qualify this conclusion by pointing out that the substantial reductions claimed will only be fully felt if the forces withdrawn are disbanded and therefore not available for NATO assignment. For example, almost all Royal Naval vessels, wherever deployed, are earmarked for assignment in one of three NATO naval categories.

13. In the case of Hong Kong, the Ministry intend to negotiate a larger financial contribution from the Hong Kong Government to the cost of main- taining our forces there. The present contribution, under an agreement which runs out in 1976, amounts to about 25 per cent. of the cost which, in December 1974, was stated by the Ministry to be about £40 million a year; this contribution represents less than 1 per cent. of the Hong Kong GNP2. Since an important function of the garrison is to assist the civil authorities in maintaining security3, we consider that a very substantial additional con- tribution should be sought from the Hong Kong Government. The size of the contribution negotiated might reasonably determine the scale of forces retained in future. The Defence and External Affairs Sub-Committee hope to visit Hong Kong later this year in order to examine the situation at first hand.

14. On Cyprus, the Ministry stated that they would certainly be likely to reconsider the requirement for both sovereign base areas in the light of the development of the situation there. In the present very fluid state, however, there could be no question of immediate withdrawal (Q.52). We are in full agreement with this approach.

15. Some extra costs will be incurred in connection with additional use of Diego Garcia following the proposed withdrawals from Gan and Mauritius, although the Ministry stated that these extra costs would be minimal com- pared with the savings from the withdrawals. Both the Maldive Islands and Mauritius have received British aid, and their economies benefit considerably from the military presence. We trust that if, in the event of withdrawal,

1 Evidence page 24, para. 8.

2 H.C. Deb., 12th December 1974, Written Answers, Col. 225.

3 Cmnd. 5231, page 18, para. 39.

4 Evidence page 24, para. 10.