SECRET #Z 高度機密
required to pay much more for a smaller garrison and their concern at this aspect is likely to divert them from serious consideration of the security aspect. But one must foresee a stormy period during which HMG, and by delegation, the Hong Kong Government, are heavily criticised.
OPTION 'A'
46. This would cost £34M per annum and comprise:
47.
Frigate
1 x UK battalion
3 x Gurkha battalions
1 x Gurkha Engineers field squadron (with a separate
training wing)
8 Wessex helicopters
This is the cheapest option but it could have significant security deficiencies. The most important of these is the shortfall of 1 1/3 units against the security yardstick (paragraph 18). This deficiency is not likely to be serious in the event of unrest arising from circumstances largely unrelated to the Chinese threat (paragraph 6 or the early stages of paragraph 8(a)). The resident garrison would be adequate to continue in support of the Police on the border (paragraph 7) and to take protective action in one or, with some dilution of effort, both remaining main areas of potential disturbance (paragraph 9). From the security point of view, such a garrison is the absolute minimum which should be considered since, with anything less, the Police IS capability would be weakened significantly.
48. In the event of unrest involving some change in Chinese policies or a weakening of Peking's authority, which led to disturbances in all three areas, including the land and sea borders, (paragraph 9), this garrison would be inadequate, even with 5 additional Police riot companies, to provide the general stiffening the Police would need (paragraph 37). However, in view of the likelihood of some forewarning of any such change in Chinese attitudes, this weakness could be mitigated by an improved reinforcement capability.
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G.F. 316
SECRET 高度機密
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