TNAG-0540-FCO40-635-Strength-of-garrison-in-Hong-Kong-1975 — Page 158

50

MINUTES OF EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON

11 February, 1975.]

[Continued

Q3. Para 9. For what purpose will we need to retain airfield facilities at Masirah

in the future?

A3. *

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Q4. Para 10. Will facilities at Gan and Mauritius be available on a commercial

basis after our withdrawal?

A4. Commercial facilities in Mauritius will no doubt continue to be available to us but obviously cannot provide secure communications in the Indian Ocean for command and control purposes. We will rely upon the Skynet system and some minor additional facilities at Diego Garcia for such communications as are essential. As far as Gan is concerned that is a matter for negotiations and it is impossible to give a firm answer at this stage.

Q5. Para 14 (ii) Would you please explain what is meant in this context by

"a limited parachute capability "?

A5. The exact composition of the limited parachute capability to be retained is currently under consideration within the Ministry of Defence, and until the studies now in hand have been completed, it will not be possible to make a definitive statement on the exact size or role of the force envisaged. It is expected that those details will be finalised within the next few months.

Q6. Para 22. Would you please explain more explicitly why the Gurkha battalion is to be withdrawn from Brunei, and state whether any savings will arise in administrative overheads special to Gurkhas?

A6. We have nothing to add to the arguments advanced in paragraph 22 of the memorandum and in oral evidence on 4 February. The Sub-Committee will recall that in 1968 a decision to withdraw the battalion from Brunei was announced. Its withdrawal will not result in any significant savings in administrative overheads; it may be possible to make some minor savings in the administration in Nepal, though the scope for this is not yet clear.

Q7. Para 23. What operational activities will be affected by the proposed

reduction in helicopter purchases?

A7.

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Q8. Para 26. What estimate has been made of any extra unit costs which may

arise from the proposal to reduce the rate of deliveries of MRCA?

A8. *

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Q9. Para 26. What estimate has been made of any extra costs of operating existing strike and air defence aircraft as a result of deferred MRCA deliveries?

A9. **

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Q10. Para 27. What will happen to the redundant Nimrod aircraft after the reduction in front line strength has been achieved? Will Nimrod aircraft be used in the AEW role; if so, will existing aircraft be converted, and at what estimated cost?

A10.

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Q11. Para 29. What are the operational implications of the proposed deletion

of the planned buy of an extra 12 medium lift helicopters?

A11. In the Central Region, the Army has to operate over wide areas. A number of medium lift helicopters were considered necessary to facilitate logistic supply and to provide an important improvement to field force mobility. The present Puma and