(DEFENCE AND EXTERNAL AFFAIRS SUB-COMMITTEE)
4 February, 1975.]
Mr. A. P. HOCKADAY, C.B., C.M.G., Mr. T. CULLEN, Mr. D. M. EVANS, Mr. G. C. B. DODDS, and Rear Admiral A. S. MORTON.
Even
for assignment to the Alliance. while they are there, it is merely a mat- ter of the length of notice that they are at for the support of the Alliance.
94. They would not be there if the blockade was not there; they would be somewhere else, presumably in some- where like the Eastern Mediterranean?
Certainly, yes. That would not be in their Alliance role, that would be in their peacetime role. In wartime they would all be allocated to either the Channel Command or the Atlantic Com- mand.
Mr. Sandelson.
95. Mr. Chairman, I presume for good reason no figures are given here in regard to the planned strength of nuclear powered submarines. From the statement that we propose in future to specialise increasingly in nuclear powered submarines, leaving conventional ones to other European navies, one assumes—and hopes that we shall, in fact, be increas- ing our strength or maintaining a strong nuclear submarine strength here. Since
I am not asking for, and would not get, figures, I would like to know whether consideration has been given to drop- ping our own conventional submarine force, because clearly this would require some maintenance and replacement of conventional submarines from time to time. Would it not from a financial aspect be better to drop that force, throw- ing that particular burden on to other European navies in return for our increased strength in the nuclear powered field? Would it seem necessary to main- tain a conventional submarine as well as the nuclear powered submarine?- Certainly all the advice that we have had in the Alliance is that there is a require- ment for both nuclear attack submarines and for conventional submarines. We see our policy as a specialisation in the European sense in the nuclear attack sub- marines but maintaining an element of conventional submarines. We see our allies, the Dutch and various others, specialising in the maintenance of con- ventional submarines and we see, there- fore, a totality of both nuclear attack subrnarines and of conventional patrol submarines.
Dr. Miller.
[Continued.
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96. Outside the jurisdiction of the field which we patrol in conjunction with our NATO allies, the question arises as to the capability which the Navy will have of defending our merchant shipping or of dealing with any other possible attack. I would rather pose the question another way: what do you think the deterrent effect of a reconstituted Navy will be on any possible aggressor in this respect? I think a deterrent effect is the "in " phrase now, rather than a capability of defending oneself?If I follow you correctly, Sir, we see our deterrent, whether it is for the protection of mer- chant ships or war, as part of the deter- rent of the Alliance as a whole.
97. Is there not also an obligation outside of NATO jurisdiction? (Mr. Hockaday.) This again comes back to the philosophy underlying the whole defence review on which we had some discussion earlier. Part of that philosophy is that against the background of the main imperatives which the Government had to seek to reconcile in carrying out this review, on the one hand the econo- mic imperatives which were judged to be pressing upon them and on the other hand the imperative need to maintain an effective force structure to ensure our own security, it became apparent that it was no longer possible for us to maintain a worldwide military presence of the type or on the scale that we have been accus- tomed to maintain in the past. As Admiral Morton has said, it is envisaged that from time to time we shall deploy forces outside the NATO area, essentially forces which are assigned to NATO in war but which are journeying around the world in peacetime and which would take longer to get back if war suddenly broke out; but we shall not have forces deployed worldwide in the same sort of numbers as we have in the past.
Dr. Miller.] That is precisely the infor- mation I wanted to elicit. I take it then you are pretty well committed to any kind of action in this respect along with our NATO allies?
Mr. Roper.
98. Could I pursue two other naval points? First of all, one of the most substantial reductions in the Secretary
No comments yet.
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