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MINUTES OF EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE THE EXPENDITURE COMMITTEE
4 February, 1975.] Mr. A. P. HOCKADAY, C.B., C.M.G.,
Mr. T. CULLEN, Mr. D. M. EVANS, Mr. G. C. B. DODDS, and Rear Admiral A. S. MORTON.
our effort should in military and politi- cal terms be concentrated so far as pos- sible upon those commitments directly relevant to the security of the United Kingdom itself or of our dependent territories, with the corollary that, as part of this policy, commitments not directly related in the same sense should be given up where this is possible.
74. There are no troops involved there other than Gurkhas?-Admiral -Admiral Morton reminds me that there is no unit stationed there as such, but there are some British loan service personnel serv- ing with the Royal Brunei Malay Regi- ment. Their future would be something to be considered separately.
Sir Frederic Bennett.
75. In your view, will it affect the use- fulness of the Gurkhas? I had some- thing to do with their training for several years. Now, so far as I know, they are being kept to go between England and Hong Kong after this?-Following the withdrawal of the battalion from Brunei I would expect that the Brigade of Gurkhas would then be divided be- tween Hong Kong and Britain, although the exact future deployment is something that still has to be worked out.
Chairman.
76. Coming back to the question I was about to ask on paragraph 13(c), I thought that ought perhaps to be at the top: "The security of the UK Home Base which is vital to NATO as well as ourselves and without which none of our other commitments could be met ". It is surely a little bit more important than are the other commitments.
Do you think our forces, including our reserves, here are adequate now or even at a time of more tension?- -(Rear Admiral Morton.) If I could answer concerning the position of the security of the United Kingdom Home Base, I think you will notice in the memorandum we said the four components are of equal priority. One of the key features of the review was that there was no strategy available to the United Kingdom except in the context of the Alliance and there was no independent strategy involving the United Kingdom except in the context of the Alliance. Therefore, as part of
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the Alliance, not only must we contribute in the Central Region, the Eastern Atlantic and the Channel, but we must contribute to the security of the United Kingdom Kingdom Home Base and afford nuclear subscription in the European context of the Alliance nuclear deterrent as a whole.
a
77. So really this is a reference to the home base as part of a base of NATO security? Yes, the United Kingdom
Home Base is used as a major base for United States augmentation air forces and as a major base for the conduct of naval and air operations by the Alliance over the Channel and the
the Eastern Atlantic.
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Mr. Roper.
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78. Could I pursue the point of the nuclear subscription
subscription which Admiral Morton brought up? There are two components. One is the extent to which we provide a base for the United States nuclear deterrent, directly or indirectly. Secondly, there is the question of our own contribution which is described in paragraph 13(d). There are two points I would like to pursue.
First of all, there is a statement in the second sen- tence that Our Allies attach to it a significance which goes far beyond the quantitative increase
etc. Are there any declarations, for example of the North Atlantic Council, which have been published which state this, or alternatively are there any published statements by our allies which make this clear? If not, what is the source of this assertion which seems to be somewhat ex cathedra? (Mr. Hockaday.) I am not aware of any published statements to this effect, I confess, but in the con- sultations that we have carried out so far it has been made clear to us by allies that in different ways, and perhaps for different reasons, they do regard it as a "good thing that there is a nuclear contribution to NATO provided by a member of the Alliance other than the United States.
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79. The next sentence goes on to say For the foreseeable future we can expect to maintain a fully effective Polaris Force for a small fraction of total defence expenditure without mov- ing to a new generation of missiles." There was a remark in the Secretary of
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