(DEFENCE AND EXTERNAL AFFAIRS SUB-COMMITTEE)
4 February, 1975.]
[Continued.
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plans now proposed, in a representative year (1978-79). But on manpower, the critical question for Parliament, for the general public, for the servicemen and for the civilians employed in Defence is, "How will the present strengths be affected? Personnel reductions were expressed as the difference between actual strengths at 1st April 1974 and the post-Review strengths at a representative time (1st April, 1979).
41. The effects on manpower of the overall strategic decisions taken so far have been assessed in very broad terms. It is not possible to equate these reductions with specific commitments from which we are withdrawing since in most cases the forces will be redeployed on other tasks and it is only by considering the totality of the commitments remaining that future manpower requirements, and hence probable reductions can be established. Even so the results will give only a broad order of magnitude and it is in this light that the figures below should be read.
Strengths 1st April, 1974
Forecast strengths at 1st April, 1979
Royal Navy/Royal Marines
Army
...
79,000
:
180,000 (including
74,000
168,000
Estimated reductions by 1st April, 1979
5,000
(including
12,000 (including
7,000 Gurkhas)
6,000 Gurkhas)
1,000 Gurkhas)
Royal Air Force
100,000
82,000
18,000
United Kingdom based civilians
249,000
235,000
14,000
Locally entered civilians
60,000
45,000
15,000
42. Considerable further work will be required to translate the present decisions in outline force levels into detailed forward manpower programmes. Until this is completed it will not be possible to indicate with any greater precision where the reductions will fall or within what timescale. Many will be achieved by normal wastage and adjustment-where necessary to recruitment targets. The need to maintain a satisfactory career structure in the Services, with a proper balance between ranks, ages and skills, which will effect the Services in different ways, will make some redundancies unavoidable but these will be kept to a minimum. However most of the locally entered civilians will become redundant. Most of the manpower reductions in each Service should be achieved by 1979.
VII.
INDUSTRIAL AND Employment Implications
43. In assessing the likely effect of these decisions on industrial manpower, it has been necessary to make a broad assessment of the overall level of employment in the defence industries. This is at present estimated at 240,000 and our best forecast, taking into account future expenditure on equipment and probable output per man and allowing for improvements in productivity, is that a reduction of some 10,000 (or about 4 per cent.) is likely over the next five years. If the increase in productivity turned out to be lower than expected, the fall in the numbers employed would be correspondingly less. Until the revised equipment programme is known in detail, we shall not be able to make a reliable forecast firm by firm, but the effect on some companies is already apparent. Westland Helicopters and the Small Engines Division of Rolls-Royce (1971), for example, will face particular problems. At Hawker Siddeley Aviation the rundown of work already expected during this period will be increased. The builders of naval ships will have fewer orders than expected. The effect of this on them individually will depend on the rest of their order-books.
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