TNAG-0540-FCO40-635-Strength-of-garrison-in-Hong-Kong-1975 — Page 133

(DEFENCE AND EXTERNAL AFFAIRS SUB-COMMITTEE)

4 February, 1975.]

[Continued.

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(b) The defence of the Eastern Atlantic and Channel which are NATO's forward areas at sea, corresponding to the Central Front on land; through which pass all the sea-borne reinforcement routes to the UK and the mainland of Europe; and where we provide the core of the ready maritime forces confronting the growing power of the Soviet Navy.

(c) The security of the UK Home Base which is vital to NATO as well as ourselves and without which none of our other commitments could be met.

(d) The UK contribution to the Alliance's strategic nuclear deterrent, which constitutes a unique European contribution to NATO's strategic nuclear capability. Our Allies attach to it a significance which goes far beyond the quantitative increase which it makes in NATO's nuclear armoury. For the foreseeable future we can expect to maintain a fully effective Polaris Force for a small fraction of total defence expenditure without moving to a new generation of missiles. We have decided that it would be entirely consistent with our policy of concentrating support of NATO in the most crucial areas for us to do this.

14. The reductions directly affecting NATO which we propose will therefore fall largely on those of our forces which would be assigned to the Mediterranean in war and the specialist reinforcement forces we have hitherto earmarked for both the flanks of NATO. These are described in detail below:-

(a) The Mediterranean :

(b) Specialist Reinforcement Forces: These were originally developed to meet our world-wide commitments as an alternative to maintaining garrisons overseas. In 1968 they were committed to NATO following the initial withdrawals from East of Suez; but we have at no time been able to afford to provide their land element with the full range of heavy and sophisticated equipment they would need to play a full part in a mobile mechanised European war. We propose no change in our contribution to the ACE Mobile Force of one battalion group, plus support units, Wessex helicopters and Harrier support, which will continue to be available to SACEUR for deployment wherever he thinks fit. But in the other Specialist forces we plan the following changes:

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(i) The Amphibious Force at present consists of a brigade headquarters, four commando groups, a logistic regiment, two commando ships (HMS Hermes and HMS Bulwark), two assault ships (HMS Fearless and HMS Intrepid), plus afloat support. We propose to retain one commando group specially trained and equipped for mountain and arctic warfare in the specialist reinforcement role for deployment in Northern Norway. The brigade headquarters and two other com- mando groups, together with combat logistic elements, would also be declared to NATO. The fourth commando, 41 Commando Group presently in Malta, would be progressively run down in strength from 1977 and finally disbanded on its withdrawal from Malta in 1979. The planned disposal date of HMS Bulwark would be brought forward and she would be paid off by 1976; HMS Hermes would be declared to NATO as an ASW carrier from 1976 onwards but would continue to be available in the secondary role as a commando ship. Plans to order in 1979 and 1981 two replacement purpose built commando ships would be abandoned. HMS Fearless and HMS Intrepid would remain in service as planned until the 1990s; but only one ship would be retained at immediate readiness in the operational role, the second ship being at more than 30 days notice whilst in care and maintenance or in refit.

In the light of these proposed changes, detailed studies are now in hand on the future amphibious capability which would be declared to NATO.

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