TNAG-0540-FCO40-635-Strength-of-garrison-in-Hong-Kong-1975 — Page 131

(DEFENCE AND EXTERNAL AFFAIRS SUB-COMMITTEE)

4 February, 1975.]

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[Continued.

(b) Maritime Forces the largest European Navy almost wholly committed to NATO and Royal Air Force strike, reconnaissance and air-defence air- craft;

(c) Both Northern and Southern Flanks-extensive reinforcement forces and bases in Gibraltar, Malta and, though not involving commitments to NATO, in Cyprus as well;

(d) The Alliance Strategic nuclear deterrent-the UK Polaris force.

4. The Government concluded that these commitments and the capabilities planned to meet them should be closely examined to discover to what extent the burden of defence expenditure could be reduced consistently with the security of the United Kingdom and of our Allies.

II. CONDUCT of the Review

5. The Defence Review was therefore announced on 21st March with the primary objective of safeguarding our national security by the maintenance of a modern and effective Defence System whilst reducing its cost as a proportion of our national resources and bringing this figure more into line with that of our major European Allies. Such a programme required a concentration of our future defence forces on those areas of greatest need and where the UK contribution to common defence could be deployed most effectively. It followed the guiding principle that NATO is the linchpin of British security and will remain the first charge on the resources available for defence. A firm set of strategic priorities was therefore drawn up as guidelines for the analysis; but apart from this, no preconditions were written into the exercise and in particular no arbitrary financial targets were set. Instead different allocations of resources were examined for the ten-year period and the implications, military, political, economic and industrial were carefully considered.

6. From the outset it was decided that the process of redeployment and concen- tration must be an orderly one to allow for proper military, manpower and industrial planning. It was also agreed that commitments should be reduced in line with capabilities in order to avoid further over-stretch in our forces, and that properly balanced forces should be maintained as an insurance against the unforeseen. It has been one of the cardinal principles of the review that a proper balance should be struck between the competing demands of economy and security so that neither the military credibility of current NATO strategy nor the political cohesion of the Alliance should be undermined. The striking of this balance eventually led to the provisional conclusions announced by the Secretary of State for Defence on 3rd December; final Defence Review decisions will not be taken until consultations with our Allies are completed.

III. THE ANALYSIS AND OVERALL STRATEGY

OUTSIDE NATO

7. The analysis quickly established that our non-NATO commitments were of lowest priority in strictly military terms; but that, in political terms, our obligations to our remaining dependencies, some of whom are faced with territorial claims by neighbouring states, should be retained; and in certain other cases the arguments against our withdrawing in present circumstances were very strong. It was also apparent that while the direct financial savings to be expected from these commit- ments were comparatively small-total withdrawal would save only about £150 million a year-some were significant in terms of capabilities foregone in the areas of highest military priority in NATO and also in terms of resources allocated to air transport, afloat support etc. It was concluded that substantial reductions could be made as a result of a contraction of our commitments outside the NATO Alliance.