TNAG-0540-FCO40-635-Strength-of-garrison-in-Hong-Kong-1975 — Page 103

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SECOND REPORT FROM

CONCLUSIONS

40. The objective of this brief inquiry has been to reach some preliminary conclusions on the defence review proposals. By the time this Report is published the full results of the discussions with our allies may be known. Despite this problem of timing, we hope our comments may assist the House and outside observers in their consideration of the White Paper and the revised defence policy which it will expound.

41. We do not seek to criticise the review proposals as a whole at this stage although when the final decisions have been taken we may wish to examine some aspects in greater depth. We repeat our earlier observation that, given the economic state of the country and the increasing burden of defence spending in the public expenditure projections, a review of the kind under- taken by the Secretary of State was inevitable. In the circumstances the results in general appear to do as little damage as could have been expected. However, we must emphasise the significance of losses of capability which impair the Services' ability to react speedily and effectively to unforeseen events. These proposed changes may therefore have a harmful effect on morale and on recruitment generally. Although NATO remains the first priority, and the identifiable cuts in commitments are outside that area, or confined mainly to its Southern flank, significant reductions in our planned contribution to the Alliance form a major part of the Secretary of State's proposals. While we have cast some doubt on the credibility of the previous programme for equipment, it is undeniable that, for example, delays in MRCA deliveries must result in loss of effectiveness of the RAF in Europe. Our NATO allies have already requested reconsideration of cer- tain aspects of the proposals which we also have found disturbing and we trust that the Ministry will do their best to find ways of lessening the impact of the review in those areas (Q.226).

42. We believe it is damaging to create the public impression that defence can be a recurrent and easy source of short-term economies in public ex- penditure. Militarily, morale in the Services and the spirit of co-operation and determination in the NATO Alliance are affected by constant refer- ences to reviews, reductions and redundancies. Moreover, from the limited evidence we have taken on the subject, we are extremely doubtful whether industrial and human resources freed by contractions or cancellations in the defence field are properly and fully utilised in civil work in the United Kingdom.

43. We summarise our other main conclusions, as follows:

(1) The review proposals are based on projections of economic growth which may prove to be optimistic, particularly in the short-term (para- graph 6).

(2) The Government should give serious consideration to the effect on the morale of the Services and on our defence commitments before making further short-term cuts while the review decisions are being imple- mented (paragraph 6).

(3) A long-term defence review was necessary due to our deteriorating economic position and the previous programme, LTC 74, had become unrealistic (paragraphs 7 and 37).