TNAG-0539-FCO40-634-Strength-of-garrison-in-Hong-Kong-1975 — Page 92

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Mr Wilford

Am. 2012

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I have seen.

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DEFENCE REVIEW: BRUNEI

62)

I have seen Mr de Courcy Ireland's minute of 17 February but not the previous papers.

1.

2.

It is true that the current proposal for the Hong Kong garrison is that it should be reduced from 62 major units (including 3 British and 3 Gurkha battalions), to 5 major units (including 4 Gurkha battalions and one 1 British). There would thus be an increase of 1 Gurkha battalion which would have to come from somewhere. But:-

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fithin the forces

(a)

The proposal is that this change should take place during 1977/78, not "before April 1977" as suggested in DS11's brief quoted by Mr de Courcy Ireland.

(b) There is no certainty that the extra battalion would

in fact have to be the one from Brunei. There is also the Gurkha battalion in the UK. Room would have to be found in the NATO area for the two British battalions to be removed from Hong Kong. I understand that it is therefore likely that the UK-based Gurkha battalion will have to move.

(c)

(a)

are to be substantially out.

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3.

It is not the case, as suggested by DS11, that the increase of 1 Gurkha battalion in Hong Kong is a feature which is likely to remain whatever the final outcome of our consultations. We are about to examine with the Hong Kong Government the possibility of reducing the garrison to 43 major units. Unless it is to become an all-Gurkha force, which the Ministry of Defence would resist, there could not, within this garrison, be more than 3 Gurkha battalions (i.e. the present size of force).

Others are more expert than I on the validity of the argument that the Gurkhas would have to accept their fair share of the overall cuts. I thought it was unlikely that British soldiers would actually be discharged as a result of the Defence Review.

I think it follows from the above that we cannot say categorically that the Gurkhas must be removed from Brunei because they are required in Hong Kong. They may or they may not be. I have checked this with the Head of DS6 who agrees. I am not familiar with the arguments for and against leaving a battalion in Brunei. But as far as Hong Kong is concerned, it is arguable that the Brunei force is and could remain a useful strategic reserve, particularly when the rapid reinforcement capability from the UK is abandoned. This reserve capability might, it is true,

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