TNAG-0539-FCO40-634-Strength-of-garrison-in-Hong-Kong-1975 — Page 251

SECRET

UK EYES 'A'

71

Foreign and Commonwealth Office London SW1

JD Bryars Esq AUS(GS)

Ministry of Defence Main Building Whitehall

Telephone 01-

Your reference

Our reference

Date

20 February 1975

LAST

64

Dear Desmond,

HONG KONG DISCUSSIONS

I enclose a copy of Hong Kong telegram no. 162 which we discussed.

1.

2.

Subject to your views I would like to send an answer to para. 1(B) on the following lines. It seems to me dangerous to get hooked on a firm requirement either for £35 m. or for a 4 unit force. The remit from Ministers is to try to close the gap.

I have drafted as if Ministers had not yet made up their minds, but you may think that in view of the replies from the Chancellor and the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, policy is now, in fact, settled as we hoped. “ý »

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3.

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The passage would read as follows:

11

our

Your (B). We agree to your guidelines but suggest that the underlying objective should be to try once again to plan modified and cheaper forces that could do the job.

The suggestion put to Ministers of about £35 m. was based, as you will remember, on a rough estimate of what a 4 unit force might cost. But we would not see any magic in either figure. If the job can be done for less, or with fewer troops, or with a different mix of forces, so much the better; while if the team concludes at the end of the day that there is no possibility of doing the minimum that is required for as little as £35 m., then we would think it much better that they should say so, so that final political decisions can be taken in the light of the true facts. All this was why we suggested that the survey should be done in Hong Kong, so that full account can be taken of all security factors, including the police.

The situation might be different if there was already agreement that Hong Kong should pay half the cost, since £35 m. would then be relevant to your estimate of what Hong Kong can pay. But that is not, of course, the present negotiating position, since Ministers' preferred option remains unchanged. The proposal has therefore had to be put to them on the basis that officials should explore ways to help close the gap.

This is what we think they should now be doing.

MECRET UK EYES 'A'

Yours we",

A C Stuart HKIOD

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