TNAG-0539-FCO40-634-Strength-of-garrison-in-Hong-Kong-1975 — Page 24

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTTAL

(c)

(a)

(e)

to earmark some additional aircraft to Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic (SACLANT)/CINCHAN for reconnaissance;

as part of national deployments to participate in

periodic NATO maritime exercises and in the NATO Nav:1

On-Call Force in the Mediterranean;

to continue reinforcement options for the Special

Air Service Regiment in the Southern Region of Allied

Command Europe.

32. The Government is prepared on the same understanding and without commitment, to study nationally and within the Alliance other measures

aimed at mitigating the effects of our reductions. Our ability to imple-

ment the measures which our Allies wish us to adopt will depend particulary

on their willingness to give us assistance, eg with "host nation"

facilities for ships, men and aircraft. Decisions on these further

measures will be announced, where appropriate, as they are taken.

NON-NATO COMMITMENTS

33. At the beginning of 1975 Britain still maintained forces in

various parts of the world (see Annex C

deployment of UK forces in early 1975).

for a map showing the

Some of these deployments

reflect inescapable obligations, notably to the security of our

dependent territories; others reflect former aspirations to a world-wide

role. They absorbed a comparatively small proportion of the defence budget:

withdrawal from all of them, including the garrisons in the

Mediterranean, would save £150 million a year at most. But this

represented a significant sum in terms of the savings which would

qtherwise have had to be found exclusively from our higher priority

Consequently, we proposed to withdraw from our non

NATO tasks.

I-17 CONFIDENTIAL