TNAG-0536-FCO40-631-Strength-of-garrison-in-Hong-Kong-1975 — Page 54

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SECRET:

(a) Is it accepted that we aim for an agreement not

earlier than May, with a holding reference only

being included in the Defence whit e Paper?

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(b) Should we be prepared to concede the transitive

costs in negotiation (see paragraph 6)?

(c) Is the risk that Hong Kong would attempt to play

a decisive role in defence matters to be accepted

reason for not seeking a contribution of more

than 50% from them?

(d) Should a study be carried out with Hong Kong of

the implications of a garrison costing about £35M,

on the basis that it might form an element in a

compromise agreement?

(e) Should the implications of even cheaper garrisons

be studied?

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(f) Is the Governor's view accepted that Hong Kong

should not be asked to pay more than £17M, at least

in the early years?

(g) Should we indicate to Hong Kong that the UK would be

prepared to pay more than 25% of the cost of the

garrison if the cost of the garrison were reduced

below £40M or if Hong Kong were prepared to pay more

than £17M, possibly under a graduated arrangement?

Subject to the Committee's views on these points,

with Hong Kong the military implications of a £35M garrison will be studied

(and of cheaper garrisons if the Committee so wishes) and

formal negotiations will be opened. We would aim (subject

to the Committee's view on timing) to report back by April.

11.

-6- SECRET