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promise would amount to. He was advising Mr Ennals to keep a low profile in Rhodesia, not to enter into negotiations and not to see too many people. Nevertheless, he would ask Mr Ennals if he could find time to see the two trade union centres, though he believed that they reflected the political views of the two main African groups, the ATUC being aligned to ZANU and NAFU to ZAPU.
18. Mr Smith had begged Mr Callaghan not to call a Constitutional Conference. Mr Callaghan had compromised by saying that he intended to call a Conference but would not set any date in the hope that there would be a move towards agreement within Rhodesia itself. Only if such moves failed would Britain convene a Conference. Mr Callaghan thought that the odds were still against a settlement within Rhodesia. We would then have to consider what action Britain should initiate, but first it would be necessary to await Mr Ennals' return. A major difficulty is of course the struggle for power between ZAPU and ZANU. Mr Nkomo undoubtedly aspires to leadership but Bishop Muzorewa has proved to be a tougher character than he appears. Mr Callaghan's advice to him had been to sort out policy and leadership before negotiations with the Smith régime.
19. Mr Callaghan thought that Mozambique would be in deep trouble if they closed the frontier against Rhodesia, even though Britain had promised assistance in this eventuality.
Chile
20. Mr Callaghan said that the Chancellor of the Exchequer had already made clear our refusal to reschedule Chile's debts, though West Germany, the USA, France, Japan and Canada had agreed to do so. These countries had insisted that the Chilean Government accord them priority before any sums are paid to countries such as the United Kingdom, Holland and Italy which had not agreed to reschedule debts. Our stand on this point is therefore costing us money and if our policy proves to be ineffective it will be necessary to take a second look at the problem. Mr Jones emphasied that rather than change our line we should apply what sanctions we could against Chile. For example, we should impound Chilean material in this country and look for alternative sources of copper, for example from copper producing countries in the Group of 77. Mr Callaghan said he doubted whether we could afford such measures and whether, in any event, they would be sufficiently influential in bringing about a change in Chile. To impound warships being built for Chile in this country would have wide implications. For example, countries in Latin America had orders in this country for warships amounting to £160 million and their representatives had frequently expressed concern to him over the continued agitation in this country for Chilean vessels to be impounded. Legally these ships belonged to the countries which had ordered them and he had found it necessary to assure them that contracts would be honoured. Their fear is that what is done to Chile today, for a particular set of reasons, may be done to others tomorrow for other reasons. Mr Jones interposed to say that not all Latin American countries supported the
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