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the development of adequate public services for the population and needed the cooperation of all in the furtherance of this object. The Chinese, we would judge, would take the hint but would be most unlikely to comment substantially on such observations. On the other hand they would regard Hong Kong as a natural subject for the Secretary of State to raise in a general way because of the very
direct joint interest arising from the presence of Hong Kong on China's borders.
12.
Such an approach will almost certainly provoke the Chinese into renewing their request for an official representative in Hong Kong. Conceding this point is open to the objection that
the Chinese would prematurely interpret it as a change of course and
the arrival of the first incumbent might well be seen in Hong Kong as the first overt sign that a change in the status of the Colony is in prospect, with consequent destabilising effects. The Chinese would doubtless say that the latter fear was unreal because the functions of such a representative could be carefully defined to avoid misinterpretation. The Secretary of State might say that on the face of it the present informal method of dealing with business through Peking's unofficial representatives in Hong Kong (e.g. the representative of the NCNA) seems to us to be working well from the point of view of both sides. If pressed, he might ask whether there are any additional advantages to be gained by having an official Chinese representative to outweigh these disadvantages, not least to China's interest in the status quo.
Hong Kong & Indian Ocean Department 15 August 1975
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