of a known trafficker and indicates the type of person in whom they are interested. They suggest that this sort of profile can be used by agents working in conjunction with immigration authorities and overseas Embassies to keep on the alert for possible traffickers, particularly from suspect areas.
COCAINE TRAFFICKING (Item 8)
12. Robert Frice, the DEA Staff Assistant, Latin American Section, gave an account of cocaine traffic from South America to the UK and Europe, as seen through DEA eyes.
The main focus in Europe was on use in Italy. The type of user described was a middle-aged person, upper class, well-to-do, who might be called "one of the jet set". He described a network, run by Chilean organisers in Italy, which was alleged to be bringing cocaine into the US by carrier by air from Colombia through London, where it was often held for a period, and then Vancouver or Montreal. There was an estimated 20 kilos a month in transit. This was one of the less impressive presentations and nothing very precise or helpful emerged in the discussion.
SUGGESTIONS FOR IMPROVING EFFECTIVE CO-OPERATION (Item 9)
13.
On the final afternoon. after our meeting with the Cabinet Sub-Committee for South East Asia (at which Rolph gave a briefing on the position in Hong Kong) we met to develop ideas for further co-operation that had arisen out of the two days' discussions. The following points were suggested:-
(i) Exchange of officers. This was suggested by the DEA. Their idea was an exchange of young officers early in their career between the three countries. They would be given training and made familiar with the local scene on an attachment of two or three months, virtually as students. The UK delegation did not receive this too enthusiastically: we pointed, in particular, to the shortage of officers, which precluded long attachments for training; but we undertook to take it away and consider it. I think, however, that the real disadvantage is that it is not particularly advisable for young officers to go to the US to work alongside DEA agents, whose modus operandi is, to a large extent, totally alien to ours. Furthermore, the training of foreign officers on attachment for a substantial time places considerable burdens upon officers here who have an operational job to do. This does not (and did not) seem a starter, and accordingly I proposed as a fall back, two alternatives:-
(a) that there sho:ld be opportunities for exchange for specialist officers who were taking on particular posts or jobs. I had in mind the Customs officer who heads the heroin group in Investigation Division, for whom a visit to Hong Kong very early during the period of his appointment could be of particular value. Similarly, were it to be decided that a group of policemen should again deal with Chinese heroin traffickers, as had been done in Gerrard Street last year, a visit by the head of such a group to Hong Kong at an early stage in the operation could be of value.
(b)
that there should be liaison between the Head of the Intelligence Unit and his counterparts in Hong Kong and in the DEA.
The Americans have been,
over the last year, developing their intelli ence potential, planing for regional intelligence units, and building up trafficker profiles and network analysis patterns in order to identify traffickers on a world-wide basis. Some of this is what the Central Drugs Intelligence Unit started by doing. and there could be advantage in the periodical interchange of expertise in this field.
It was agreed that the UK should follow through these ideas with the European Regional Head of the DEA (Paul Knight) and the new DEA agent to be appointed to London (Mr Katz). Hr Jordan and Commander Morrison would meet them at an early date.
6.
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