CONFLER AL
Committee for the Far East and by subsequent events, was that the efforts of the Hong Kong police and preventive (i.c. customs) service could be made Lore effective (this was not to underestimate what they were already achieving) with better coordination between the services and with more imaginative and outwund locking leadership. The new head of the Narcotics Pureau (the police side) muy well produen a more enlightened approach, but the change at the top of the reventive
reventive Versice not seen for the better and the Commissioner for Narcotics, although le bra den a much to broaden the perspective of long long's law enforcement activity, de atill inclined paradoxically to be complacent about Hong Fong's capacity to Fadle the position on its own resources. The presence of the United ⠀ingdon at the proposes meetings will enable Hong Fong to exploit the expertise of the TEA (without being ce exposed to the risk of political pressure from the UCA) and to draw directly or indirectly upon such expertise in this field as is available in the Unite and at the same time expose the long kong authorities to the stimulus of : critier but friendly eye upon their activities.
in to.
(iii) The United States wanted the United Kingdom to become more directly involved for
a number of reasons (of varying validity). They felt that they had carried the burden alone in 32 Asia for too long and wanted our support; they considered that the Laited kingdom is as threatened by heroin being trafficked from (5 Asia and Lore Kong as the USA; they were aware that the United Fingden is responsible for Jean Kong's foreign affairs; and, while publicly expressing satisfaction with the deproo of cooperation they enjoyed with Hong rong and the performance of the long long law enforcement agencies, privately they considered that both might be improved and they though wut there was a better chance of achieving this with direct Vaited Finadas involvement. y discussion with 'r Bartels did not suggest that their views have changed. ithdrawal by the United Kingdom at this stage will not be welcomed by the USA and, taken in conjunction with our reluctance to give wholehearted support to them in their efforta to persuade the Turko not to lift the ban on the cultivation of the opium poppy, could damage the generally good working relationship which we have with them in this field (whether this would have any wider political consequences, I do not know).
7. To sum up, I consider that the United kingdom should continue to participato both because of the potential advantage to be gained by the United kingdom and long song in more effective law enforcement against drug trafficking and for political reasons. Ch the other hand, I do not think that the exercise should be open ended. Where is no point in having meetings if the situation does not warrant it. At present it does, both in the United Kingdom and in long song • Accordingly, if we agree to participate, we should do only on the condition that the need for cooperation at the level proposed be kept under regular review (it could be an agenda item at each meeting).
8.
So far as representation is concerned, I suggest that previous experience and the political element involved points to the United kingdom being represented by the Head of Home Cffice Drugs Branch. If the agenda of a particular meeting or the current situation in the United Kingdom warrants it, I would propose inviting Customs Investigation Branch and/or the Fetropolitan Police to provice a senior officer as part of the delegation (tals was done last year, and Hr Jordan and Fr Goods have said informally that they would be prepared to cooperate).
9.
I therefore recommend that the Foreign and Commonwealth Office be informed
(i) that the United Kingdom should continue to participate in the proposed 115/4loaj Xong/UK meetings for the time being and subject to review;
(ii) at the lead of lone Office Drugs Branch will represent the United Kingdom
subject to paragraph 10 below;
and
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