TNAG-0496-FCO40-561-Deportation-of-foreign-nationals-from-Hong-Kong-1974 — Page 169

(259) DJ.S97459 250m 12/72 G.W.B.Ltd. Gp.863 141) DJ.897300 250m G.W.B.Ltd. Gp.863

9/72

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

CONFIDENTIAL

therefore air superiority. He did not believe that

there would be a North Vietnamese offensive until Hanoi

judged that the situation was ripe, for instance if they

felt that there was dwindling US support for the South

or popular discontent there which they could exploit;

but provided the US continued to give aid he thought-

they could manage despite the current critical economic

situation.

5. Mr Hattersley enquired what sort of US support they

needed. Mr Bac said military aid within the terms of

the Paris Agreement, notably replacement supply of

equipment on a one for one basis, whether aircraft or

ammunition; and economic aid to make the country self-

supporting as soon as possible. They did not wish to

be dependent on foreign aid, but could not do without it

so long as the burden of a huge army had to be carried

because of North Vietnamese military pressure. An

enhanced economic aid programme could bring the economy

to take off point within 3 4 years. There would be

no need for military aid at all if North Vietnam would

respect the Paris Agreement and cease its military

pressure. Dr Kissinger was to present a 5-year plan to

the Congress shortly.

6.

Mr Hattersley asked about the passage in the US/

Soviet communiqué about improvements in the situation

in Indo-China. Mr Bac said he could see no signs of

recent improvements so far as South Vietnam was

concerned but he was not entirely sceptical. The

communiqué did not tell the whole story;

have been some discussion of the subject.

there ust

Mr Hattersley

asked what influence the USSR would have in Hanoi.

CONFIDENTIAL

/Mr Bac