TNAG-0487-FCO40-552-Review-of-death-sentence-in-Hong-Kong-1974 — Page 122

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the words complained of were uttered by the learned commissioner on the day after his repeated correct references to the burden of proof, the jury might have forgotten his original reiterated

directions upon that score.

Mr. Downey, for the 4th appellant, complained that the

commissioner had failed adequately to direct the jury on the

evidential value of the appellants' three statements to the police

which were almost wholly exculpatory. We see no merit in this

ground of appeal because we do not consider that the directions given

were, in the context of the summing-up as a whole, deserving of

the criticism made of them. In the case of the first statement

the learned commissioner's first direction was:

"And it is you who will have to decide what it is vorth".

A further direction in regard to that statement was:

"Well, you must road carefully the statement of the 4th accused","

after which the learned commissioner dealt with some of its contents.

In relation to the statement made by the 4th appellant upon being

charged with murder, the learned commissioner said:

"You must read that one and consider it".

The real substance of Mr. Downey's complaint was in relation to the

4th appellant's third statement made in answer to the charge of

false imprisonment, in the course of which she denied killing anybody

and in respect of which the commissioner said:

"Of all that you must consider and decide whether you can accept it or not."

It was counsel's contention that this last direction left

the jury with the alternative of accepting or rejecting the statement and with no middle course of being left with a reasonable doubt as

to its truth. The concept of reasonable doubt had however been

thoroughly explained to the jury and we think it unnecessary for the learned commissioner to have reiterated that concept at every

step; in the context of the summing-up as a whole, we do not consider that the jury could have had any illusions as to the nature of their duty had they been left in doubt as to whether to accept or reject any particular statement of the 4th appellant. That duty was to give the benefit of the doubt to the 4th appellant in respect of that particular statement.

But it still remained for the jury to balance

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