TNAG-0487-FCO40-552-Review-of-death-sentence-in-Hong-Kong-1974 — Page 117

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So

4th appellant did not directly exculpate himself in any way.

clear is this that perhaps no warning at all was necessary in the circumstances, but be that as it may, we are inclined to adopt the further words of Diplock L.J. in the same case where he said:

"It is desirable in most cases that perhaps a little more should be said by way of warning than was said by the Chairman in this case, but each case depends upon its own facts and in the view of this Court

the warning which he gave was adequate for those purposes."

Indeed this was not the only warning given by the learned commissioner

in respect of the evidence of others as to the activities of the

4th appellant for in the course of his summing-up the learned

commissioner said of the 4th appellant:

"Of course you have to bear in mind that other accused persons might think that they would push all the blame onto her, off themselves, in the hope or expectation

that she might be more leniently dealt with being a woman".

Moreover, quite apart from the warning given by the

learned commissioner it is apparent that there was abundant evidence

of corroboration in the recitals of events given by YEUG Shing and

Pik Kwan and this rendered apposite the words of Humphreys, J. in

the case of Garland

(4)

O

The learned judge there said:

"The evidence of corroboration was clear and convincing. We are satisfied that if there had been a direction to the jury on the subject of accomplices, which we regret was not given, it would have made no difference to the result

of the case. On, that ground we dismiss the appeal".

As we have said, we are of the view that there was no

necessity for a direction in regard to corroboration in respect of

any of the appellants but had the matter been otherwise we would,

in view of the ample evidence of corroboration, have adopted the

same course as did the court of criminal appeal in the case of

Gerland.

A ground of appeal common to all the appellants was that the learned commissioner failed adequately to direct the jury upon

the matter of common intention. It was said that the direction

given, failed to leave to the jury the question whether each

accused had the same intention as the person or persons he was assisting.

(4) (1942-44) 29 Cr. App. R. 46n.