TNAG-0486-FCO40-551-Review-of-death-sentence-in-Hong-Kong-1974 — Page 49

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that ins'ta case of m. know what is. In' this nothing, and I am not time, or mine, by givi of murder."

We think that little need be said abou

der, then I don't

se it is murder or ing to waste your

to you the definition

this matter.

Clearly the

sonable view that, provided

at was the person who had

than that the act which caused

nd done with the intention at

Mr. Chird concedes that,

and are precluded from considering

course the effect of the

10 present case.)

learned Chief Justice took the not unr the jury were satisfied that the appel strangled the girl to death and then hinserted four knives violently in her neck thereby inflictig wounds which, on their own, were more than sufficient to have caus d her death, they could not come reasonably to any conclusion othe her death was voluntary, inexcusable,

least of causing grievous bodily harm. apart from some doubtful instances culled from the reports of proceedings in certain of the Famous B itish Trials series, he has been unable to find any case in which the customary direction on the

mitted. elements con tituting the crime has be n

Mr. Sedgwick does

not deny that there may be circumstans in which it is proper for a trial judge to direct the ury that tl y must either acquit altogether or else convict of the offence charged any alternative verdicts, which was learned Chief Justice's direction in however, that the decided cases show are only legitimate in cases where the assumption of an accepted state of fats. even if the jury were satisfied that was the accused who had killed the girl, the question whether the killing had been done with the necessary intention to constitute the crime of murder was one to be answered by the jury by way of infere ce from the primary facts and was not to be treated as though the answe were itself an accepted primary act. While therefore it might be true to s y that the judge was correct not to leave manslaughter to the jury on any such basis as provocation, accident or diminished r sponsibility since there was no evidential basis for such a findir 5; and while it would also be true to say that there was nothing in the evidence to suggest that the killing was the result of necesse y self-defence, automatism or insanity, nevertheless the question injuries were inflicted wis a questi Technically speaking this is no doub

e present case.) He maintains, at such "directions to convict"

direction proceeds upon the

In counsel's submission,

the intention with which the

of fact to be decided by the jury. the correct view and we think