SECRET
3
The future of the several million inhabitants born in the Colony or in possession of British (Hong Kong) nationality would also present a human and political problem of very considerable proportions.
5. An eventual solution of the problem of Hong Kong would be greatly eased if conditions in China ceased to be so harsh and idiosyncratic, and if the prospect of subjection to them did not spell terror to so many of the population, and loss and even personal danger to the expatriate residents and investors. One cannot foretell how likely such a softening of Chinese domestic administration may be, but while it is very unlikely under present leadership, it may come about in time, though there is no guarantee that it will. Against this background there is a great deal to be said for allowing time for changes in China to develop before taking any initiative on the future of Hong Kong. Fortunately there is no need to hurry, because the present leaders in China have said in terms that they are satisfied with the present status of the Colony for the time being, and are in no hurry to change it.
6. Meanwhile it is the object of the Hong Kong Government to see that China's legitimate interests in Hong Kong are not prejudiced, and to cultivate sufficiently easy relations with the many CPG officials in Hong Kong to ensure that as much as possible routine business about Hong Kong's extensive relations with neighbouring China can be transacted locally, with only the more important or intractible matters being dealt with through diplomatic channels in London and Peking. Broadly speaking such relations now exist and we are anxious to maintain them
7. For their part Chinese officials in Hong Kong are overtly helpful and friendly. Behind the scenes we know that they use their influence with, e.g. Left- wing unions, to avoid normal industrial action being perverted into confrontation with the Government-presumably in case it gets out of hand and thus affects their basic interests in the Colony. But at the same time they pursue, through "united front" tactics, their objective of conditioning the population to acceptance of the excellence of Maoist China and eventually of return to China. This includes the propagation through their Press media and other channels of influence of all stories calculated to cause disenchantment with the Hong Kong Government and to discredit its intentions and those of Her Majesty's Government in regard to Hong Kong. It also involves the progressive purchase of commercial influence through widening of the CPG stakes in the Colony. I believe that in so far as the CPG's policy towards Hong Kong is formulated it is to achieve a situation similar to that in Macau in which the CPG enjoy all the commercial and financial advantages of the status quo while exercising complete control over policy and administration-a power which at present they exercise with some discretion- through the influence on the Portuguese Government of their chosen unofficial representatives in Macau.
8. In these from their point of view not unreasonable political endeavours, they tend to be handicapped by the population's intimate knowledge of conditions in Kwangtung and by the periodic violent paroxisms which have characterised Maoist China. I might add that above all they are frustrated by the economic success of Hong Kong which has enabled the population's standard of living to progress to levels unattainable in China.
9. So the time-scale of the CPG's policy towards Hong Kong is long, and for the time being their shorter-term tactics are not making notable progress with the population. The question arises what use the Hong Kong Government should make of this breathing space.
151645-9
SECRET
B*
No comments yet.
Private notes are available after approval.