TNAG-0480-FCO40-545-Strength-of-garrison-in-Hong-Kong-1974 — Page 153

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He fears

undesirable effect. Nor does he favour the compromise

suggested at our meeting, of referring to "a larger

percentage" rather than "a larger contribution".

that the result in Hong Kong would be much the same.

6. He advises that it would be much better from the

point of view of his ability to influence things in "ong

Kong, if the reference to an intention to cut the garrison

and insist on a higher contribution could be omitted.

"lowever, he accepts that UK Ministers might come under

pressure in Parliament to go further than the first version

which he favours. In that event he suggests that there

would be less objection to using t'e substance of the second

text in answer to supplementaries.

Nor would he see

objection to it being used for background briefing of the

British press.

What he is anxious to avoid is an official

statement on the record.

6.

We must give weight to the Governor's advice. It is

not simply a matter of meeting Hong Kong's susceptibilitics.

If they decline to raise their contribution as we require,

we can press them to reconsider their decision;

+

but if they

prove obdurate, we may be faced with the choice of weakening

the garrison still further or of meeting the deficit ourselves.

Sir Murray's tactical advice on how to avoid this situation

is highly relevant.

7. I see from paragraph 8 of C(74)133 that a formula

close to that quoted in paragraph 3 above is the one which

/Ministers

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