TNAG-0479-FCO40-544-Strength-of-garrison-in-Hong-Kong-1974 — Page 191

SECRET

ANNEX A TO COS 1401/130/1/2

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RAFT LETTER FROM DUS(P) TO SIR DUNGAN WATSON, KCMG

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DEFENCE REVIEW HONG KONG

1.

You will wish to know the outcome of recent discussions with CBFHK about the future level of our forces in Hong Kong.

2. As you know the Governor suggested in his telegram number 973 of 27 September that in view of HMG's decision that the Hong Kong Government should be asked to contribute 75% of the costs of the garrison, he would prefer to recommend a presence along the lines of Option 'C' in CBFHK's original paper. He also suggested that if we could make further economies and reduce the total costs to about £30M we would be approaching something that he could propose to the Executive Council as a viable political and budgetary proposition.

3. Taking this as a starting point, the problem has been considered in depth and it is now agreed that the best way of meeting these criteria would be a reduction to 5% major units. This was just acceptable even though it might take 3 weeks before a batttalion from the UK could be complete in Hong Kong as a reinforcement in an emergency. As I mentioned in my letter of 24 September this should, however, be the worst case. I must also emphasize that we consider that a garrison of 5% major units is the absolute minimum necessary to maintain a credible presence and that it would not make sense in military terms to reduce the garrison below that level.

4. I attach a breakdown of the costs and composition of such a garrison, which you will note, includes 4 Gurkha Infantry Battalions. The cost at about £31M is still above the Governor's figure of £30M but well below our initial suggestion of a garrison costing £38M. But the only certain way it can be reduced further, while maintaining a credible presence, is instead of withdrawing 2 patrol craft, withdraw the frigate with a further saving of some £2 total cost to under £29M.

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5. To sum up I think that we are able to move some considerable way towards meeting the Governor's position and that he should now be told that it is possible to reach a figure of £31M if we reduce to 5% major units and keep the frigate and 3 patrol craft. But he should be left in no doubt that this is the absolute minimum and that the only further front line saving that we could support, would be the withdrawal of the frigate leaving 5 patrol craft.

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