TNAG-0479-FCO40-544-Strength-of-garrison-in-Hong-Kong-1974 — Page 129

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NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

that the outcome should not affect credibility of

the agreed PATO strategy. We have also been deter-

mined that our action should not cut across the

current US initiative, which we support, to ensure

pays sufficient attenta to those measures necessary to ensure a stalwart conventional

that a

capability.

we have therefore attached t82 hirber

weightings in our analysis to the Front line strength

of the British armed forces, and in particular to

units which are

those forward-based on continental Europe.

L

we

maintain on the European mainland some 60,000

soldiers and the second tactical air force. /409

of the trained strength of the army and almost 502

of our combat units are in Germany, and most of the

army units maintained in the United kingdom itself

exist directly or indirectly to custein or reinforce.

PAOR. This commitment is very costly in both

budgetary and balanceof payments terms. We have

nevertheless decided that in view of the import: nee

for Allied strategy of the caintenance of ethetri vo

viable forward-based forces, and the nerd

to preserve the Alliance's MBPli neroliating

erotiating position, also in mind,, there shall be no cuts in Brok in

advance of BBWR. horeover, we shall maintain on

current capability to reinforce BAOR repid) widh

30,000 repular soldiers and 57,000 reservisto freq

the United Kingdom. we have examined the option of

dual-basing. It has some attractions from the

bal:nce of payı ente point of view, but none from the

perspective

overall financial a

•

goul to a dypton would also he

најоская зада

sinconsistent with our view of the

Lincor

need for ipzoptance of ready and prepositioned convention: 1

forces to resist the first impact of a Warcav j

Jact

/eth cl