TNAG-0479-FCO40-544-Strength-of-garrison-in-Hong-Kong-1974 — Page 122

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DECRET

sumes the same thomarchy't sha 2. puzzle lus

Listeners a bil

The

and of our resources which we are likely to be able

to continue

make available for defence, to rut our

future defence structure and effort on a stable basis,

readily comprehensible by the British people, and

therefore likely to be able to survive the political

in an era of apparent clefente.

and economic squalls ahead we need to ensure that

our defence priorities are seen to make sense, and

and are

that our forces are seen to be tailored to what he

allapt

British public case as essential requirerents

rather then historic legacies.

2.

A

This is the underlying rationale behind the Defence Review. We have not set arbitrary financial

limits. We have not attempted to make easy economics

through raids on the equipment votes. We have not

gone for the adjustments in procurement schedule

which can produce short-term savings but meke little military sense. kather we have built on a corpus of studies begun under the previous Administration to identify the priorities among our defence con mitrents, and to compare them with the levels of resources realistically likely to be available over a ten-year period. From this Ministers have drawn certain

broad conclusions.

Triorities

3. inisters heve recognised that British national security is inextricably involved with Allience

security. It follows that we have taken a critical look at those aspects of our defence forces, the justification for which may in the rest have rested upon arguments of national autarky. lt also follows that our aim should be to identify those elements The overall

Structur

in alliance defence which it is most important that

jallion

(1435) Dd145178 40Cm 5/73 G.W.B.Ltd. Gp.363

AJECRET