TNAG-0479-FCO40-544-Strength-of-garrison-in-Hong-Kong-1974 — Page 113

SPOTET

defence than we can afford, the strategy should be changed.

The Secretary of State might point out that the present

strategy of flexibility of response was adopted (under the

previous Labour Government) because the credibility of the

earlier strategy of massive retaliation had been undermined.

We cannot turn the clock back; nor is there any alternative

to the present strategy which would provide a credible defence

at less cost. The emphasis in the current discussion on

strategy within the Alliance is on the need to improve.

conventional capabilities so as to avoid early resort to

nuclear weapons at a time when a measure of nuclear equivalence

between NATO and the Warsaw Fact is emerging.

STRATEGIC NUCLEAR DETERRENT

tto

6. The arguments for maintaining our strategic nuclear

deterrent and for making the improvements necessary to keep

pace with Soviet developments are well set out in para 9 of

the paper. The Secretary of State may wish to support them.

NON-NATO COMMITMENTS

7. The Secretary of State might argue that we could not

wholly abandon our commitments in the Mediterranean, and outside

NATO without serious and disproportionate damage to British

interests. The proposals summarised in para 6 of the paper

represent the maximum cuts compatible with the protection of

those interests. The Secretary of State may wish to draw

on the points in the attached Annex in any more detailed

discussion.

/MBER

1

SECRET