SECRET
I think we should warn him then of HMC's intention to withdraw the Gurkha battalion from Brunei sometime during 1976 and give him notice of our wish to review our agreement with Brunei. I
see no reason why we should refrain from doing this even if we have not then concluded discussions with the Americans who, so
far as I know, have no interest in Brunei.
5. The alternative would be to avoid any discussion with the Sultan until we are also ready to negotiate with the Five Power partners. I think, however, that it should be an FCO Minister
who undertakes any such discussions, whether in Brunei or in London, since they will inevitably involve our external affairs as well as our defence responsibilities. Planning of Ministerial
visits will have to take account of this. Another factor which
will have to be considered is that, if we wish to avoid unnecessary damage to the stability of Brunei, it might well be better to invite the sultan to London for negotiations (at a time of our choosing). Against this, past experience shows that it is much less time-consuming to talk to the sultan in Brunei than to meet
him in London where he will be quite ready to spin out negotiations over many weeks.
23 September 1974
cc
Mr Stewart (HKIOD) Mr Squire (SEAD)
2 SECRET
JA Hickman
South west Pacific Dept
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