TNAG-0478-FCO40-543-Strength-of-garrison-in-Hong-Kong-1974 — Page 74

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5. In the Persian Gulf, our direct (non-volunteer) military assistance to the Sultan in the Dhofar war could probably be scaled down in due course, after consultation with the US and Oman's other allies, if the Sultan's forces continue to make progress. A British Military Advisory Team in the United Arab Emirates could be withdrawn. Other Loan Personnel in the UAE and Kuwait could usefully be retained.

6. We probably need not continue to declare forces to CENTO but it is desirable to continue our membership of the Military Committee and to continue to participate in CENTO exercises.

7. The Indian Ocean is of increasing strategic importance in view of the growing Soviet naval presence, and the Americans attach importance to it. We should if possible continue the present RN group operating scheme under which we are able to keep a small number of ships in the area for most of the year. We could however transfer our naval communications station in Mauritius to Diego Garcia if the US facilities there are expanded.

also retain the Simons town arrangements.

We should

8. The Military Facilities Agreement with Malta expires in 1979. It contains no provision for renewal and Mintoff does not at present expect us to renew it. Some force reductions might be possible towards the end of the Agreement.

9. Our naval presence in the Caribbean is useful for the defence/ internal security of the West Indies Associated States and the dependent territories. It should be retained if possible, though not necessarily on a permanent basis.

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